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DECONSTRUCTING  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 
DIRECTOR PRIMACY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE? 
 
René Reich-Graefe*
Here is my secret.  It’s quite simple: One sees clearly only with the 
heart.  Anything essential is invisible to the eyes. 
 
—Antoine de Saint-Exupéry**
 
 
 
I. OPENING SKETCHES: ABSOLUTE DIRECTOR PRIMACY 
For almost eighty years now, corporate law scholarship has cen-
tered around two elementary analytical findings made in what has once 
been described as the “last major work of original scholarship”1 within 
the field.  Since Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ The Modern Corpora-
tion and Private Property,2
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.  LL.B., 
Free University of Berlin School of Law, 1996.  LL.M., University of Connecticut 
School of Law, 1997.  I am grateful for generous financial support from the Western 
New England College School of Law and for helpful comments and support from Bar-
bara Noah (who also made sure that I broke up and changed all of those long sentences 
that each ran for an entire paragraph).  All errors are mine (and any remaining single-
sentence paragraphs were reinserted later due to my stubbornness). 
 corporate theory has first regarded the sepa-
ration of ownership and control (i.e., the defining notion characterizing 
the large, publicly held corporation with widely dispersed shareowner-
** THE LITTLE PRINCE 63 (Richard Howard trans., Harcourt 2000) (1943). 
 1. Roberta Romano, Metapolitics and Corporate Law Reform, 36 STAN. L. REV. 
923, 923 (1984).  See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 4-5 (2008) (describing Berle and Means’ The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property as “what still may be the most influential 
book ever written about corporations”). 
 2. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932). 
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ship)3 as the “master problem for research.”4  As a second analytical in-
quiry, it has designated the resultant problem of affecting control over 
independent corporate managers through both legal and market forces as 
the fundamental agency (cost) problem of corporate law.5
 
 3. See id. at 84-89, 119-25.  Accord FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND 
PROFIT 291 (1921) (“The typical form of business unit in the modern world is the corpo-
ration.  Its most important characteristic is the combination of diffused ownership with 
concentrated control.”).  See also STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 3-5, 72 
(2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter, BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW]; JAMES D. COX & THOMAS 
LEE HAZEN, CORPORATIONS 39-40 (2d ed. 2003); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director v. 
Shareholder Primacy in the Convergence Debate, 16 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 45, 46 (2002) 
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy]; William W. Bratton, Berle 
and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L. 737, 739-40, 753-59 
(2001); Oliver Hart, An Economist’s View of Fiduciary Duty, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 299, 
303 n.9 (1993) [hereinafter Hart, An Economist’s View]; David Millon, Theories of the 
Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 214; Charles R.T. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur and 
the Theory of the Modern Corporation, 31 J. CORP. L. 753, 754 (2006) [hereinafter 
O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur]; Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States Corporate 
Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 259-60 (2010).  
On the legacy of Berle and Means and their groundbreaking research, see generally 
Kelli A. Alces, Revisiting Berle and Rethinking the Corporate Structure, 33 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 787 (2010); Bratton, supra; William W. Bratton, Jr. & Michael L. Wachter, 
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 
34 J. CORP. L. 99 (2008); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s 
Footsteps: The Trail of The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 849 (2010); Charles R.T. O’Kelley, Berle and the Entrepreneur, 33 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1141 (2010); Harwell Wells, The Birth of Corporate Governance, 33 SEATTLE U. 
L. REV. 1247 (2010). 
 
 4. Romano, supra note 1.  See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, 
at 3-4 (stating that “[t]he conflicts of interest created by [the] separation of ownership 
and control drive much of corporate law”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 6 (discussing 
the effects of the separation of ownership and control); Alces, supra note 3, at 787 (de-
scribing the separation of ownership and control and the resultant agency cost problem 
as “a central concern of the law of corporate governance”); id. at 789 (describing the 
separation of ownership and control as “the defining problem facing corporate gover-
nance”); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 754 (stating that the “central 
problem of the modern corporation” is found in its “separation of ownership and con-
trol”); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. 
FIN. 737, 740 (1997) (“The essence of the agency problem is the separation of man-
agement and finance, or – in more standard terminology – of ownership and control.”). 
 5. See, e.g. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 75 (“Much of corpo-
rate law is best understood as a mechanism for containing […] agency costs.”); Marga-
ret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Intro-
duction, 24 J. CORP. L. 743, 743 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Team Production] 
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The latter problem of efficient corporate control, in particular (i.e., 
that magical—if, perhaps, elusive—balance between managerial discre-
tion and managerial accountability),6 must be regarded, at least analyti-
cally, as “unfinished business.”  Solvitur ambulando,7 we have certainly 
made good progress “stumbl[ing] forwards in our empirical fashion”8
 
(describing the agency cost problem of monitoring managers and motivating them to act 
as faithful agents as “the central economic problem to be faced in a public corporation” 
for those following the principal-agent model of the firm); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn 
A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1807 (2001) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness]; 
Phillip I. Blumberg, Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis, 50 B.U. L. REV. 
157, 177 (1970); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL 
APPROACH 21, 22 (2004); Marcel Kahan, The Limited Significance of Norms for Corpo-
rate Governance, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1877-78 (2001); Millon, supra note 
 
3, at 
221; Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, 
Norms, and the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2001); 
Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48 (discussing the agency problem as the cen-
tral problem of corporate governance).  See also Rudolf Richter, The New Institutional 
Economics: Its Start, Its Meaning, Its Prospects, 6 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 161, 179 
(2005) (stating that the central problem of Williamsonian transaction cost economics is 
ex-post opportunism). 
 6. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 207 (2002) [he-
reinafter BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS] (“Establishing the proper 
mix of discretion and accountability […] emerges as the central corporate governance 
question.”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doc-
trine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine]; 
Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 524-25 
(1992); Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors, 
93 IOWA L. REV. 929, 947-48 (2008); Pinto, supra note 3, at 266; Shleifer & Vishny, 
supra note 4, at 742-44. 
 7. “It is solved in walking”: 
A civilian system differs from a common law system much as rationalism differs 
from empiricism or deduction from induction.  The civilian naturally reasons from 
principles to instances, the common lawyer from instances to principles.  The civi-
lian puts his faith in syllogisms, the common lawyer in precedents; the first silently 
asking himself as each new problem arises, “What should we do this time?” and 
the second asking aloud in the same situation, “What did we do last time?” . . . The 
instinct of the civilian is to systematize.  The working rule of the common lawyer 
is solvitur ambulando. 
Thomas Mackay Cooper, The Common Law and the Civil Law—A Scot’s View, 63 
HARV. L. REV. 468, 470–71 (1950). 
 8. Frederic W. Maitland, Outlines of English Legal History, 560-1600, in II THE 
COLLECTED PAPERS OF FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND 438–39 (H.A.L. Fisher ed., 
1911).  Maitland famously characterized the methodological approach of the English 
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and have been successful at developing a good number of insightful and 
valuable microtheoretical9 models of the firm10
 
common law as follows: 
 but, as I have analyzed 
King Henry and his able ministers came just in time––a little later would have 
been too late: English law would have been unified, but it would have been Roma-
nised.  We have been wont to boast, perhaps too loudly of the pure ‘Englishry’ of 
our common law.  This has not been all pure gain.  Had we ‘received’ the Roman 
jurisprudence as our neighbours received it, we should have kept out of many a 
bad mess through which we have plunged.  But to say nothing of the political side 
of the matter, of the absolute monarchy which Roman law has been apt to bring in 
its train, it is probably well for us and for the world at large that we have stumbled 
forwards in our empirical fashion, blundering into wisdom. 
Id. (emphasis added).  See also RAINER MARIA RILKE, RILKE ON LOVE AND OTHER 
DIFFICULTIES 25 (John L. Mood, trans., W.W. Norton 1975) (“Do not now seek the an-
swers, which cannot be given you because you would not be able to live them.  And the 
point is, to live everything.  Live the questions now.  Perhaps you will then gradually, 
without noticing it, live along some distant day into the answer.”). 
 9. Microtheoretical models of the firm focus on the internal cohesion, adaptability 
and survival of the firm as a generator and maximizer of productive output and econom-
ic wealth and, thus, largely ignore distributive concerns—namely, whether the externa-
lized costs of generating and maximizing economic wealth are fairly/effectively distri-
buted and whether the resultant economic wealth itself is fairly/effectively distributed.  
Cf. William T. Allen, Contracts and Communities in Corporation Law, 50 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 1395, 1396 (1993); Millon, supra note 3, at 201-02; Edward B. Rock & 
Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law: Introduction, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 
1608 (2001). 
 10. The four main models in today’s academic discussion can be labeled as “share-
holder primacy,” “contractarian,” “team production,” and “director primacy.”  See, e.g., 
Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy, supra note 3 (discussing shareholder-
primacy and director-primacy models); John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of 
Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are U.S. Corporations?, 24 J. CORP. L. 837 
(1999) (discussing team-production models); George W. Dent, Jr., Academics in Won-
derland: The Team Production and Director Primacy Models of Corporate Gover-
nance, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1213 (2008) (discussing team-production and director-primacy 
models); Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate Law: The Role of Sharehold-
er Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637 (2006) (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Ian B. 
Lee, Efficiency and Ethics in the Debate About Shareholder Primacy, 31 DEL. J. CORP. 
L. 533 (2006) (discussing shareholder primacy and team production models); René 
Reich-Graefe, Deconstructing Corporate Governance: Absolute Director Primacy, 5 
BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 341 (2011) (discussing all four models); J.W. Verret, 
Treasury Inc.: How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and Practice, 27 YALE J. 
ON REG. 283, 315-26 (2010) (discussing all four models as well as ‘agency theory’ and 
‘progressive corporate law theory’).  For a more general discussion of those firm mod-
els, see also Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception that the Corporation Is a Nexus of 
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819 (1999); O’Kelley, The 
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in more detail elsewhere,11 we are still a significant distance away from 
fully explaining “the wisdom” that Berle and Means so thoroughly and 
masterfully “blundered into.”12  Measured by the predictive ability and 
accuracy of such models13
 
Entrepreneur, supra note 3; Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a 
Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J. CORP. L. 807 (1999) [hereinafter Wallman, Under-
standing]. 
 (i.e., their respective ability to predetermine 
 11. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
 12. See Maitland, supra note 8, at 439.  See also Donald C. Langevoort, The Hu-
man Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of 
Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 832 (2001) (“Until we discover 
exactly what directors hear amidst all the noise, we cannot begin to evaluate the wisdom 
of our bundle of legal and regulatory strategies touching on questions of boards of di-
rectors’ responsibilities.”) (emphasis added).  For the so-called “Berle-Dodd debate” 
between Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and E. Merrick Dodd, Jr. in the wake of the Great Depres-
sion and their dialectic development of fiduciary duties and, thus accountability, of cor-
porate managers, see Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd, For Whom Are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate 
Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1365 (1932); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., 
Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 
2 U. CHI. L. REV. 194 (1935).  See generally William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Con-
ception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 273 (1992) (discussing 
the Berle-Dodd debate); William W. Bratton, Jr. & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholder 
Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 99, 122-34 (2008) (same); Fisch, supra note 10, at 646-48 (same); A.A. Sommer, Jr., 
Whom Should The Corporation Serve? The Berle-Dodd Debate Revisited Sixty Years 
Later, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33 (1991); Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of the Cor-
porate Directors (Or, Why You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your 
Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 22 (2003) [hereinafter Stout, Proper Motives] (“The de-
bate between the ‘shareholder primacy’ view and ‘stakeholder’ models of the corpora-
tion dates back at least seventy years, and it remains unresolved today.”) (footnote omit-
ted); Joseph L. Weiner, The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation, 
64 COLUM. L. REV. 1458 (1964).  In an interesting twist to today’s prevailing views on 
shareholder primacy, Berle explicitly conceded defeat of his shareholder primacy model 
to Dodd’s stakeholder-oriented model once A.P. Smith Manufacturing Co. v. Barlow, 
98 A.2d 581 (N.J. 1953), was decided.  See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., THE 20TH CENTURY 
CAPITALIST REVOLUTION 169 (1954).  See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Pri-
macy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 561 n.70 
(2003) [hereinafter Bainbridge, Primacy]. 
 13. Predictive ability and accuracy is, of course, the main criterion by which posi-
tive (descriptive) economic models are evaluated.  See, e.g., Milton Friedman, The Me-
thodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE ECONOMICS 3, 11-12 (1966); 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS: AN ANTHOLOGY 180, 186 (Daniel M. Hausman ed., 
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both investor and manager behavior subject to an ambient mix of mo-
tives, incentives, aspirational legal mandates14 and market forces15), we 
have been stuck at a crossroads for some time now.  Descriptively, we 
have been able to design coherent models of the firm that explain current 
corporate reality (but for some “second- or third-order quibbling”16
 
2d ed. 1984) (“But economic theory must be more than a structure of tautologies if it is 
able to predict and not merely describe the consequences of action; if it is to be some-
thing different from disguised mathematics.”) (footnote omitted); Fred S. McChesney, 
Positive Economics and All That, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 272, 278 (1992) (reviewing 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW (1991)) (“Positive economics submits itself to the rigor of scientific 
method.  Submission means that the model’s value is to be judged not only by its inter-
nal consistency and adherence to accepted principles, but also by its ability to predict 
the occurrence of events in the real world. It must be possible to derive from the model 
behavioral implications, at least some of which must be empirically falsifiable and 
therefore testable.”); Fred S. McChesney, The “Trans Union” Case: Smith v. Van Gor-
kom, in THE ICONIC CASES IN CORPORATE LAW 231, 253 (Jonathan R. Macey ed., 
2008); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 755, 757.  See also BAINBRIDGE, 
supra note 1, at 2-3; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts of the Corporation 
(A.K.A. Criteria? Just Say No), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 77, 81 (2005) [hereinafter Bain-
bridge, Competing Concepts]; Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being Trusted, 
81 B.U. L. Rev. 591, 596 (2001) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trusted]. 
 that 
 14. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 89 n.37; Julián Javier Garza, 
Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Role of Minority Shareholders – A Compara-
tive Study, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 613, 629 (2000); Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 934; Mitchell, 
Trusted, supra note 13, at 613; Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Dela-
ware Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1015 (1997); Rock & Wachter, 
supra note 9, at 1608.  See also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Law 
as a Facilitator of Self Governance, 34 GA. L. REV. 529, 529 (2000) [hereinafter Rock 
& Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator] (“[O]ne should think of fiduciary duty 
cases as judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate performance and that 
criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially when, no 
direct legal sanction is imposed.”) (footnote omitted). 
 15. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 562; Margaret M. Blair & 
Lynn A. Stout, Specific Investment: Explaining Anomalies in Corporate Law, 31 J. 
CORP. L. 719, 724 (2006); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production 
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 252 (1999) [hereinafter Blair & Stout, A 
Team Production]; Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and the Breakdown of the Board: 
Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. REV. 105, 119-20 
(2006); Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. 
ECON. 110, 112 (1965); Millon, supra note 3, at 230; Pinto, supra note 3, at 276-79. 
 16. Roberta Romano, What is the Value of Other Constituency Statutes to Share-
holders?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 533, 534 (1993); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, Economiz-
ing Legal D-B8, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 25, 29 n.12 (2005) (“Waffling is obligatory to 
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remains).  Normatively, however, our models operate in a large concep-
tual vacuum (or “black box”).  We are regularly presupposing an unack-
nowledged “something” that is currently largely unexplained and unac-
counted for—something that, for lack of a better general term, I call 
“protolegal variables”17
In a related article,
—in order to control for both managerial beha-
vior and the microtheoretical models of the firm that attempt to describe 
and predict such behavior. 
18 I have developed an absolute director primacy 
model of the firm that has led me—at least, tentatively and for the time 
being—to two conclusions and one dilemma.  First, I concluded that the 
board of directors of a Berle-Means corporation is the private-sector 
equivalent of a modern Leviathan.19 The board itself, not shareholders 
on aggregate nor the corporation, is the corporate sovereign—both de 
facto and de jure.  Its decisionmaking is by fiat20 and its decisionmaking 
authority to run the corporation’s business and affairs as it sees fit is ab-
solute,21 original,22 infinite23 and, thus, sui generis24
 
law-review writing. I actually think it’s better. Probably.”) 
 (hence the moniker 
 17. By “protolegal variables,” I mean all those socio-contextual, behavior-oriented, 
and reciprocal normative implications and foundations of interpersonal cooperation 
which are based on “expectations,” “counter-expectations,” and “expectation-
expectations.”  See infra Parts IV-V. 
 18. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
 19. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396 (“Under the liberal-utilitarian model, the law 
creating and protecting property rights and the law enforcing contracts is the law of 
greatest importance to our welfare.  The legal value of the highest rank in this classical 
liberal view is, I suppose, human liberty, and the greatest evil is oppression by the levia-
than state.”) (footnote omitted). 
 20. Such authoritative decisional determination by the board is—in the genuine 
meaning of the term “fiat”—both dictatorial and, ipse dixit, valid.  It is non-reviewable 
and, ipso facto, irrebuttably assumed to be right (which, of course, is exactly the effect 
of the courts’ applications of the business judgment rule).  See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gor-
kom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (“The business judgment rule exists to protect and 
promote full and free exercise of the managerial power grant to Delaware directors.”) 
(citation omitted); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 38-45. 
 21. See HOWARD H. SPELLMAN, A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
GOVERNING CORPORATE DIRECTIONS 4-5 (1931) (“[M]odern decisions tend toward an 
emphasis of the directors’ absolutism in the management of the affairs of large corpora-
tions; the board of directors has achieved a super-control of corporate management and 
of the corporation’s legal relations . . . .”) (emphasis added); Morton J. Horwitz, Santa 
Clara Revisited: The Development of Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173, 214 
(1985) (“But modern corporate legislation, passed during the first quarter of the twen-
tieth century, ratified a new ‘absolutism’ that courts themselves had already begun to 
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“absolute director primacy”).25
 
bestow upon corporate directors.”) (emphasis added); see also Blair & Stout, A Team 
Production, supra note 15, at 251 (stating that at the peak of the corporate hierarchy 
“sits a board of directors whose authority over the use of corporate assets is virtually 
absolute”). 
  Comparable to the Hobbesian perpetual 
 22. Cf. Manson v. Curtis, 119 N.E. 559, 562 (N.Y. 1918); Burrill v. Nathant Bank, 
2 Met. (Mass.) 163, 166-67 (1840); BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 74; 
ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 22 (1986) (“The model behind corporate law’s 
treatment of authority is one of a unilaterally controlled flow of authority from a single 
wellspring of power rather than a bubbling up and flowing together of many individual 
sources of personal power.  The state has power; it chooses to delegate it to the board of 
directors of a corporation.”); Horwitz, supra note 21, at 216. 
 23. Cf. Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. Process., in PROGRESSIVE 
CORPORATE LAW 185, 190 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Mitchell, 
Trust] (“The power and control that are present in all fiduciary relationships is exagge-
rated in the corporation where the indeterminate length of the enterprise and the practi-
cally infinite array of investment opportunities for the corporation make any possibility 
of specified limitations on directors’ power or ongoing control by the stockholders un-
realistic.”). 
 24. Sui generis decisionmaking authority of corporate directors means that their 
decisionmaking power is non-derivative.  In particular, shareholder primacy models in-
correctly assume that the decisionmaking authority of corporate boards is derivative, 
i.e., delegated to corporate boards by the shareholder franchise—at least, through the 
mechanism of board elections during which shareholders vote.  This assumption ignores 
the de lege lata reality of board authority.  See supra note 29 and accompanying text; 
see also Dooley, supra note 6, at 467 (describing the problem of allocating authority 
within the corporate firm as “the universally recognized requirement for the establish-
ment of, and vesting of supreme authority in, the board of directors”) (emphasis added); 
Horwitz, supra note 21, at 214 (“At some point at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury, American legal opinion began decisively to shift to the view that ‘the powers of 
the board of directors … are identical with the powers of the corporation.’  Earlier, the 
dominant view, as expressed by the United States Supreme Court, was that ‘when the 
charter was silent, the ultimate determination of the management of the corporate affairs 
rests with its stock holders.’”) (footnotes omitted). 
 25. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 6 (explaining 
the director primacy model developed by Professor Bainbridge); BAINBRIDGE, supra 
note 1; Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Board of Directors as Nexus of Contracts, 88 IOWA 
L. REV. 1 (2002); Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6; Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); 
Bainbridge, Competing Concepts, supra note 13; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Pri-
macy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006); Stephen M. 
Bainbridge, Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers: Preliminary Reflections, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 791 (2002); Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12; Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Much Ado About Little? Directors’ Fiduciary Duties in the Vicinity of Insolvency, 1 J. 
BUS. & TECH. L. 335 (2007); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy 
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bellum omnium contra omnes within the sovereign state,26 I have argued 
that the corporate entity is inescapably and insolubly characterized by 
perpetual conflicts among self-interested corporate constituents.27  To 
manage those conflicts—which present a perennial, systemic risk to the 
internal cohesion, adaptability and, thus, prosperity and ultimate survival 
of the firm—corporate law is necessarily called upon to allocate infinite 
and absolute decisionmaking authority within one core group of corpo-
rate constituents.28  American corporate law is unmistakably clear as to 
the identity of such single core group of corporate constituents—namely, 
the corporation’s board of directors.29
 
in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 769 (2006); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a 
Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002); 
Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 196-98 (2004). 
  As a result, I have argued that the 
well-advised, disinterested corporate board of a Berle-Means corpora-
 26. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN OR THE MATTER, FORM & POWER OF A 
COMMONWEALTH, ECCLESIASTICAL AND CIVIL, ch. 13 (1651) (“Hereby it is manifest, 
that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are 
in that condition which is called war; and such a war, as is of every man, against every 
man.”); cf. Peter J. Burke & Jan E. Stets, Trust and Commitment Through Self-
Verification, 62 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 347, 347 (1999). 
 27. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
 28. See KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 69 (1974) (“Under 
conditions of widely dispersed information and the need for speed in decisions, authori-
tative control at the tactical level is essential for success.”); Allen, supra note 9, at 
1400; Bainbridge, Primary, supra note 12, at 552; Dooley, supra note 6, at 466; see al-
so Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621. 
 29. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2010).  See also REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT 
§ 8.01(b) (ABA 1984) (“All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the author-
ity of, and the business and affairs of the corporation managed by or under the direction 
of, its board of directors . . . .”).  Under the corporation statutes of all states, corpora-
tions are managed by or under the direction of a board of directors as the statutory de-
fault rule.  See, e.g., Dent, supra note 10, at 1216 (2008); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The His-
torical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
89, 92 (2004); Ribstein, supra note 25, at 188. See also BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, 
supra note 3, at 72 (stating that (i) shareholders have “virtually no power to control” the 
business and affairs of the corporation, (ii) the board of directors and senior manage-
ment “effectively controls,” and (iii) “[a]s a doctrinal matter, moreover, corporate law 
essentially carves this separation into stone”); COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 149 (stat-
ing that the board of directors “is legally the supreme authority in matters of the corpo-
ration’s regular business management”); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The European Origins 
and the Spread of the Corporate Board of Directors, 33 STETSON L. REV. 925, 925 
(2004) (“Around the world, the legal norm is that corporations are managed by, or un-
der the direction of, a board of directors.”) (footnote omitted). 
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tion is uncontrollable in absolute terms.30  In other words, my absolute 
director primacy model—unlike all other microtheoretical models of the 
firm—explicitly denies that any meaningful measure of director accoun-
tability exists in American corporate law.31
After having allocated absolute, original, infinite and sui generis 
authority for making adaptive decisions for purposes of firm sustainabil-
ity in a core group of decisionmakers, my second conclusion concerned 
the end (rather than the means) of any corporate governance system.
 
32  
Not only should such a system allocate authority and discretion for mak-
ing adaptive decisions on behalf of the firm,33 it should also define, if 
possible, the norms and interests that should guide the internal deci-
sionmakers in their decisionmaking.34
 
 30. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
  Otherwise, any exercise of deci-
 31. It should be noted that this statement is only made with regard to the agency 
(cost) problem of directorial shirking, not the more controlled and controllable agency 
(cost) problem of directorial stealing.  In other words, directors are granted full discre-
tion to act opportunistically—unfettered by any ex-ante or ex-post legal constraint—and 
to favor any particular cause or firm participant interest over any and all others at any 
point in time as long as (i) no controlling economic self-interest of directors is actual-
ized (and remains unsanitized) in the decision, (ii) very minor and basic process due 
care is complied with, and (iii) some rudimentary (and, possibly, entirely hypothetical) 
rational basis and explanation can be construed as to why the prevailing consensus at 
the time of the board action might have been that the corporation could ultimately bene-
fit in some (tangible or intangible) shape or form.  See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE 
LAW, supra note 3, at 110 (concluding that pursuant to the effects of the business judg-
ment rule, corporate directors are given “carte blanche to make decisions that might 
turn out badly, but no discretion to make selfish decisions”); Blair & Stout, Team Pro-
duction, supra note 5, at 746 (stating that, as a matter of law, corporate directors remain 
“insulated from the direct command and control of [shareholders] or any other corpo-
rate constituents”); Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate 
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1470 (2006); Stout, Proper Motives, supra 
note 12, at 6 (stating that the business judgment rule “allows a director who makes even 
a minimal effort to become “informed” to make foolhardy decisions all day long, with-
out fear of liability”). 
 32. Cf. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 552. 
 33. Cf. Dooley, supra note 6, at 466; Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People 
Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 127-28 (2009) (discussing the treatment of the corpora-
tion’s internal decision structure (CID Structure) as developed by philosopher Peter 
French; see PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); 
Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207 (1979)). 
 34. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1400; Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 
552; Dooley, supra note 6, at 466.  See also Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621. 
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sionmaking authority would always be arbitrary: an uncontrollable board 
of directors would also always be an out-of-control board of directors. 
However, here I argue that there are no recognizable and enforcea-
ble decision-guiding norms or principles within our current American 
corporate law as it is written.  Accordingly, if, pursuant to my first con-
clusion above, I deny the existence of any ex-post-investment director 
accountability in American corporate law, I logically end up now with 
my second conclusion that denies the existence of any ex-ante-
investment determinability of director behavior.  Corporate law does not 
define the ends of corporate governance.  It only builds an aspirational 
and indeterminate profit-seeking motive into the corporate entity.35
If these two conclusions were absolutely true, however, no rational 
investor would be participating in a firm knowing that its central deci-
sionmaker can always act arbitrarily and always get away with it.
  
Whether and how directors will, in fact, seek overall profitability re-
mains anyone’s guess.  Furthermore, how directors can be motivated to 
seek (optimal) profitability remains a mystery. 
36  
Thus, I posit that the extent to which the board of directors as sovereign 
may exercise its absolute, original, infinite and sui generis authority on 
behalf of the corporation must be conditional on, and controlled by 
“something”—“something” that, within current microtheoretical models 
of the firm, is logically indeterminable.37  Therefore, I argue that we 
need to consider model-transcending protolegal variables (for example, 
any applicable moral obligations)38 and explain their external, exogen-
ous influence39 over current microtheoretical models of the firm40
 
 35. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738 (2005) (“Corporate managers have never had an enforceable 
legal duty to maximize corporate profits.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1643-44. 
 in or-
 36. Cf. Schlanger v. Four–Phase Systems Inc., 555 F. Supp. 535, 538 
(S.D.N.Y.1982) (stating with regard to investors who trade shares in well-developed 
markets in reliance on the integrity of the price set by the market that ‘‘it is hard to im-
agine that there ever is a buyer or seller who does not rely on market integrity. Who 
would knowingly roll the dice in a crooked crap game?”).  I argue that the same inves-
tors also rely on at least some minimum “floor” of integrity of corporate directors and 
the resultant robustness of their decision-making—both in process and in substance. 
 37. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
 38. In the parlance of economics, there is, however, the risk that these variables 
turn out to be “observable, but not verifiable.” See Oliver Hart, Norms and Theory of 
the Firm, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1701, 1702 (2001) [hereinafter Hart, Norms and Theory]; 
Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1617. 
 39. Cf. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1702. 
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der to properly model the firm-internal intricacies of corporate gover-
nance with sufficient predictive ability. 
Finally, all of the above presents the absolute director primacy 
model with an immediate dilemma:41 the board of directors in a Berle-
Means corporation is not only autocratic, but it can also be totalitarian if, 
when and where it so pleases.42  As a matter of corporate law, the board 
of directors is akin to an “unguided missile.”  There are no recognizable 
decision-guiding norms or principles—either enforceable43 or aspira-
tional44—within our current American corporate law as it is written.  It 
seems that the inner intelligibility of our corporate law aspires to be in-
tentionally and purposefully unspecified and diffuse.45
 
 40. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1397 (describing how proponents of the social model 
of human interaction see the utility of law resting “in part on presupposition of shared 
norms including those of fairness and trust”). 
  Inevitably, 
 41. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1807 (calling this dilemma 
a “riddle” of corporate law); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 8 (describing this 
dilemma as a “basic mystery”). 
 42. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1791 (“The net result is 
that, as a practical matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after 
leaving her board meeting than she is to pay damages.”); Jones, supra note 15, at 117 
(“Independent directors face an infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to 
the corporation caused by their breach of fiduciary duty.”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 
23, at 190 (stating that “directors have largely unlimited power over the corporation and 
its affairs”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 6 (“The business judgment rule . . 
. allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become ‘informed’ to make 
foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability.”); id. at 7 (“[I]t is only a slight 
exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be at-
tacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of 
care.”).  See also Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35 J. CORP. 
L. 239, 242 (2009) (“It is dangerous and costly to assume that fiduciary duties function 
well in the corporate context.  The assumption may give shareholders a false sense of 
security or a belief that they are able to discipline management effectively when in fact, 
because of the very limited nature of corporate governance duties, they are not.”). 
 43. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 614. 
 44. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 89 n.37; Garza, supra note 
14, at 629; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 934; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 613-14; 
Rock, supra note 14, at 1015; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9.  See also Rock & Wach-
ter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator, supra note 14. (“[O]ne should think of fiduciary 
duty cases as judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate performance and 
that criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps especially 
when, no direct legal sanction is imposed.”) (footnote omitted). 
 45. Cf. Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the Me-
diating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L. Q. 403, 436 (2001) (“As a solu-
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boards can be opportunistic and generate substantial, entirely uncontrol-
lable economic agency costs for the investment positions of other firm 
participants within the corporate wealth-generation structure.46  Corres-
pondingly, as an investor, one seems to be relegated to only something 
like “hope”47 (or—more to the point—“trust,” “loyalty” and similar so-
cio-contextual,48 behavior-oriented and reciprocal49 variables50 based on 
pre-coded expectations and counter-expectations and aimed at reducing 
social complexity51
 
tion to the contracting problems associated with team production, the mediating board is 
obviously messy.”). 
) that directors know what they do, that they have in-
 46. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 4 (stating that, if we only consider 
financial rewards to directors, i.e., make assumptions based only on rational selfish be-
havior of directors, “directors seem to have little reason to break a sweat in the board-
room”). 
 47. Cf. id. at 18 (stating that “we must inevitably rely on directors’ internalized 
sense of responsibility as their primary if not their sole motive for exercising judgment 
and care”) (emphasis added). 
 48. See id. at 13. 
 49. Cf. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 159 (2000) (“Reciprocity means that in response to 
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than pre-
dicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are fre-
quently much more nasty and even brutal.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1402 (trust, loyalty); Bainbridge, Primacy, su-
pra note 12, at 551 n.21 (guardianship, duty); Dent, supra note 10, at 1221 (trust); Hart, 
An Economist’s View, supra note 3, at 306 (reputation, integrity); Hart, Norms and 
Theory, supra note 38, at 1702 (honesty, trust); id. at 1703 (decency, fairness); id. at 
1714 (reputation, trustworthiness); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production 
in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 J. CORP. L. 869 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Trust and 
Team] (trust, loyalty, duty); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 767 (integri-
ty); id. at 769 (confidence); Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608 (corporate culture); 
id. at 1609 (trust); id. at 1611 (credibility); id. at 1613 (reputation); D. Gordon Smith, 
Team Production and Venture Capital Investing, 24 J. CORP. L. 949, 969 (1999) (firm 
reputation); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 1 (altruism); id. at 7 (reputation); 
id. at 8-9 (sense of honor, responsibility, sense of obligation; integrity, trustworthiness); 
id. at 20 (character). 
 51. Cf. NIKLAS LUHMANN, LOVE AS PASSION: THE CODIFICATION OF INTIMACY (Je-
remy Gaines & Doris L. Jones trans., 1986); NIKLAS LUHMANN, RISK: A SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY (Nico Stehr & Gotthard Bechmann trans., 1993); NIKLAS LUHMANN, SOCIAL 
SYSTEMS (John Bednarz, Jr. & Dirk Baecker, trans., 1995); NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST 
AND POWER 69 (Howard Davis et al. trans., 1979); Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Con-
fidence, Trust: Problems and Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING 
COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 94, 97 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) [hereinafter Luhmann, 
Familiarity] (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to contingent 
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ternalized the correct moral compass,52 and, thus, using such compass, 
will “do the right thing”53 more often than not.54  However, hope—as a 
form of nonrational, intuitive confidence in particular outcomes that is 
designed to avoid the rational analysis of, and confrontation with, the 
consequences of current actions—does not appear to be something that 
we can and should accept as a satisfactory explanation and basis for the 
daily phenomenon of general investor confidence ex-ante-investment in 
the face of absent director accountability ex-post-investment.55  The in-
quiry thus becomes: if profit-maximizing is not enforced by corporate 
law,56 why does it nonetheless happen as a matter of almost overwhelm-
ing routine in today’s corporate reality?57
 
events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappointment. You 
neglect this because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not know what 
else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and to withdraw 
expectations without having anything with which to replace them.”).  See also Blair & 
Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796; Geoffrey P. Miller, Norms and Interests, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 637, 641 (2003); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191; Lynn A. 
Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 407, 410-15 (2002) [herei-
nafter Stout, Investor Confidence]. 
  If indeed, director primacy is 
 52. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 35, at 740 (“internalized moral norms”); Stout, Proper 
Motives, supra note 12, at 23 (“internal gyroscope”). 
 53. Cf. Nadelle Grossman, Director Compliance with Elusive Fiduciary Duties in a 
Climate of Corporate Governance Reform, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 393, 465-66 
(2007); Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, 
at 9, 23.  See also Michael J. Meurer, Law, Economics, and the Theory of the Firm, 52 
BUFF. L. REV. 727, 740 (2004) (stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable con-
tingencies in transaction-cost-theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a 
firm gets managers to be pure profit maximizers”). 
 54. To complicate things further, much of what happens in the corporate board-
room (and can be hoped to happen in the boardroom) depends on the particular corpora-
tion and follows the (aspirational and prevailing) procedures, standards and practices 
for director behavior of such specific corporation; see, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra 
note 9, at 1608. 
 55. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191 (“Why would anybody invest money 
in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?”); Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 12, at 3; id. at 8 (asking why directors “seem to mostly live up to our trust”); 
id. at 9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of dollars of 
assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by 
the rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”). 
 56. Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1643-44. 
 57. Or formulated differently, the question is not only “[w]hy do shareholders in 
public companies have so little power?” (Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of 
Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 792 (2007) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 
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absolute and our theoretical models are all reliant on protolegal variables 
to explain general investor confidence ex-ante-investment despite the 
lack of director accountability ex-post-investment, then how can director 
primacy be understood and explained as a principled and, thus, just cor-
porate governance structure in the first place?  Or is director primacy not 
only absolute, but also without principle? 
This Article provides a roadmap for purposes of answering this in-
quiry.  Part II further describes the problem left unsolved to date—
namely, that we currently use largely unexplained and, thus, unac-
counted-for protolegal variables to explain and predict the decisionmak-
ing behavior of corporate directors.  Part III essays to explain why—
conceptually and normatively—we appear to need, and thus develop, 
distributional, ergo macrotheoretical, models of the firm in the first 
place.  Those models place the decisionmaking behavior of corporate di-
rectors in the larger context of our social polity.58  They inevitably ad-
dress the social benefits and costs of doing business in the corporate 
form59 and the resultant questions of sociopolitical legitimacy and alloc-
ative and distributive justice of the corporate endeavor.60
 
Stout, Mythical Benefits]), but why do shareholders in public companies have so little 
power and still invest?  Why do investors who know that they have almost no power 
over their investment ex post (other than investment exit with a predictable loss of val-
ue) still confidently decide to invest without any ex ante bargained-for accountability in 
place?  Cf. id. at 801 (pointing out an often overlooked fact of business life, namely that 
“investors are not forced to purchase shares in public corporations at gunpoint.”); id. at 
803 (“Is it possible that shareholders, like Ulysses, sometimes see advantage in ‘tying 
their own hands’ and ceding control over the corporation to directors largely insulated 
from their own influence?”). 
  Parts IV and V 
 58. Cf. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE 
ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 1, 18 
(2004); Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870; Romano, supra note 1, at 924; 
Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 809-10.  Contra Ronald J. Gilson, Separa-
tion and the Function of Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 141, 147 (2005) 
(“The point is that markets encourage a management and governance structure that fits 
the corporation’s business.  Corporate law has nothing to add to the process.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 819, 824; Lee, supra note 10, at 538-39; 
Benedict Sheehy, Corporations and Social Costs: The Wal-Mart Case Study, 24 J.L. & 
COM. 1, 3, 17-20 (2004); Randall S. Thomas, What is Corporate Law’s Place in Pro-
moting Societal Welfare?: An Essay in Honor of Professor William Klein, 2 BERKELEY 
BUS. L.J. 135, 135 (2005). 
 60. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396-97; Millon, supra note 3, at 201-02; Edward 
Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting By Signals, Playing By Norms: Complementary Ac-
counts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423, 434 (2002); 
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survey and evaluate the more recent interest of the legal academia in the 
co-existence of (corporate) law and norms and the latter’s impact on 
(and, maybe, complete control over) the former—the so-called “law and 
norms” literature.61
 
 
II. THE PROBLEM LEFT UNSOLVED: PROTOLEGAL VARIABLES 
The research on corporate governance can be described as the gra-
dual unfolding of the formerly hidden inner workings of a “black box” 
(in the sense of observable inputs, “hidden inner magic,” observable 
outputs, and end of story).62  Originally, very little academic attention 
was given to how corporations work on the inside, as corporate law it-
self was deemed uninspiring and lacking any true intellectual vigor.63
 
Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608. 
  
 61. See, e.g., Robert D. Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and 
Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1717, 1717 (2001); Jones, supra note 15, at 
121-24; Kahan, supra note 5, at 1870; Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621-22. 
 62. See e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1398 (stating that, until recently, “the internal 
operation of corporate actors was no more interesting than the internal operation of hu-
man actors”); Meurer, supra note 53, at 729-30 (describing the original theories of 
Coase and Williamson as treating the firm “like a black box in which authority avoids 
transaction costs” and concluding that “[m]odern research on the firm opens up the 
black box and gives a better account of how firms are organized and the costs and bene-
fits of firm governance”); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 757 (stating the 
firm is a “black box” in classical and neoclassical perfect competition theory); Walter 
W. Powell, Neither Market Nor Hierarchy: Network Forms of Organization, 12 RES. 
ORGAN. BEHAV. 295, 296 (1990) (describing the paradigm shift developed by Ronald 
Coase in 1937, conceiving of the firm as a governing structure, thus, “breaking with or-
thodox accounts of the firm as a ‘black box’ production function”); Christopher D. 
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE 
L.J. 1, 8 (1980) (claiming regulatory enforcement intervention imposes direct and selec-
tive constraints on how investors and managers work out various internal firm relation-
ships and the “black box” prerogative of the enterprise’s interior is, thus, overcome). 
 63. See, e.g., Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay 
for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 245 n.37 (1962) (famously conveying his sentiment 
of listlessness by stating that corporate law, “as a field of intellectual effort, is dead in 
the United States” and that nothing was left “but our great empty corporation statutes—
towering skyscrapers of rusted girders, internally welded together and containing noth-
ing but wind”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Faith and Faithfulness in Corporate Theory, 56 
CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006) (stating that corporate law scholarship was “[v]irtually 
nontheoretical until the mid 1970s”); O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 763 
(stating that after the Berle-Means era, “corporation law scholarship, if not ‘dead,’ was 
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Once Berle and Means, however, had formulated their separation para-
digm, corporate law became gradually stuck with answering the two de-
ceptively simple, but fundamentally elusive questions of the former 
“black box” of corporate governance—namely: “who control(s)?” and 
“whose interest(s) control(s)?”64
My answers to these two core questions of corporate governance, as 
developed in my absolute director primacy model,
 
65 are as follows: 
monitoring66 and bonding67 of corporate directors by other firm partici-
pants, at its very best, incompletely protects the participants’ respective 
firm-specific investments.68  Not only do directors have a residual set of 
options available to exercise their decisionmaking authority in an oppor-
tunistic manner,69 but, as a matter of corporate law, they have a com-
plete set of nonreviewable options available pursuant to their absolute, 
sui generis decisionmaking authority.  The core agency (cost) problem 
of corporate governance70
 
certainly viewed as an intellectual backwater”); Romano, supra note 1, at 923 (confirm-
ing that “[u]ntil recently, corporate law has been an uninspiring field for research even 
to some of its most astute students”). 
 is not simply residual, it is center-stage, abso-
 64. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 10, 21; CLARK, supra note 22, at 690; Bain-
bridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 549-50; Dooley, supra note 6, at 466; Reich-Graefe, 
supra note 10. 
 65. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
    66.  Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 743; James D. Cox & Harry 
L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implica-
tions of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83-84 (1985); Michael B. 
Dorff, Does One Hand Wash the Other? Testing the Managerial Power and Optimal 
Contracting Theories of Executive Compensation, 30 J. CORP. L. 255, 257 (2005); El-
hauge, supra note 35, at 739 (“[A] legal duty to maximize profits is too hard to moni-
tor.”); Pinto, supra note 3, at 260. 
 67. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 4 (“Closer analysis suggests . . . that . . 
. bonding is mostly illusory.”). 
 68. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1807-08; Cooter & 
Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1719-20; Ribstein, supra note 31, at 1434; Rock & Wach-
ter, supra note 9, at 1614. 
 69. Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614; Richter, supra note 5, at 174-75 
(“Under Knightian uncertainty, it is impossible to write a complete contract that details 
all possible future contingencies, even if transaction costs are zero.  Therefore, contracts 
unavoidably contain loopholes and the lock-in of the parties may invite opportunistic 
behavior by the other side because the parties may be unable to verify their case to a 
third party (e.g. a court) due to information costs (a special kind of transaction costs).”) 
(footnote omitted). 
 70. See, e.g. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 75 (“Much of corpo-
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lute and systemic under the absolute director primacy model.  Corporate 
directors are given vast latitude and incentive to misbehave by shirking 
on their performance.71  As a result, when the opportunity to exercise 
nonreviewable options arises, director behavior is absolutely unpredicta-
ble.  We no longer operate on a straightforward dyadic motivational 
plane: we can no longer assume that directors act either in their own sel-
fish economic interest72 or in the economic interest of a clearly defined 
group of firm participants (for example, shareholders).73  Directors can 
exercise their control over the corporate venture in any manner.  Thus, 
there is complete, not residual, resource scarcity for investors.74  Once 
we admit that we are operating in a world where legal constraints on the 
decisional substance of genuinely disinterested director behavior are en-
tirely lacking (other than, perhaps, at the outermost limits of where ra-
tionality ventures into irrationality), it becomes clear that investors face 
complete scarcity of information75—both ex-ante and ex-post—over 
which decisional motives and incentives will control (or have con-
trolled) directorial decisionmaking in a particular context.76
 
rate law is best understood as a mechanism for containing . . . agency costs.”); Blair & 
Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 743 (describing the agency cost problem of 
monitoring managers and motivating them to act as faithful agents as “the central eco-
nomic problem to be faced in a public corporation” for those following the principal-
agent model of the firm); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Basic Gover-
nance Structure, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 33 (2004); Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48 (discuss-
ing the agency problem as the central problem of corporate governance). 
 
 71. Johnson, supra note 63, at 4-5; Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
 72. Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 412. 
 73. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW, supra note 3, at 76; RICHARD W. 
HAMILTON & RICHARD A. BOOTH, CORPORATIONS 505, 506 (5th ed. 2006); Blair & 
Stout, A Team Production, supra note 15, at 290; Stout, Mythical Benefits, supra note 
57, at 804. 
 74. Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614. 
 75. Id. 
 76. This is the only substance of the so-called “waste doctrine” or “outer-limits 
test” employed by courts in order to probe for alleged due care violations with regard to 
the substance (rather than the process) of directorial behavior.  See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisn-
er, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (stating that the outer limits of directorial 
behavior “are confined to unconscionable cases where directors irrationally squander or 
give away corporate assets”); Glazer v. Zapata Corp., 658 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. Ch. 
1993) (describing the legal test for corporate waste as “severe” and explaining the test 
as follows: “Directors are guilty of corporate waste, only when they authorize an ex-
change that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could 
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The relationship between directors and other firm participants is, 
therefore, characterized by intentionally incomplete contracting.77  Un-
like all other models of the firm developed to date, the absolute director 
primacy model is the only model that posits that the incompleteness 
overwhelmingly predominates (and intentionally so); that the gaps, the 
missing parts, significantly outweigh and outnumber those parts of the 
corporate nexus that we can currently explain and account for in our 
models.  Accordingly, the role and purpose of our current law of corpo-
rate governance cannot focus on legal enforcement of what is not there 
(or is only aspired to be there in directorial behavior sua sponte).78  
Simply too much substance (which results in observable directorial be-
havioral compliance and board integrity) is not there unless by way of a 
complex process of autopoiesis.79
 
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration. If reasonable, in-
formed minds might disagree on the question, then in order to preserve the wide domain 
over which knowledgeable business judgment may safely act, a reviewing court will not 
attempt to itself evaluate the wisdom of the bargain or the adequacy of the considera-
tion.”); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997) (explaining that direc-
tors might be held liable under the waste test in cases where the benefit to the corpora-
tion is “so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range at which any reasonable 
person might be willing to trade.”).  Cf. Dooley, supra note 6, at 479-80 (describing 
possible board decisions that “even viewed ex ante, seem so degraded from ordinary 
prudential standards as to seem at least ‘half-crazy,’ if not full-blown demented”); Da-
vid Rosenberg, Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 
304 (2007); id. at 314 (“There must be a point at which a court will look at a decision 
that appears to be free from any hint of disloyalty and review it simply because of its 
utter galactic stupidity.”) (footnote omitted). 
  We can observe and explain why it is 
 77. Cf. Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1614.  Contractarian theories of the firm 
use the words ‘contract’ and ‘contractual’ in a broader sense to include non-consensual 
rational economic relationships that are premised on implicit, self-governing arrange-
ments between firm participants which do not result from express bargaining and, thus, 
do not constitute actual contracts in the legal sense.  See, e.g., HAMILTON & BOOTH, su-
pra note 73, at 330; Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 822-23; Rock & Wachter, supra note 
5, at 1650, 1688; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1613.  Accordingly, within this Ar-
ticle, I indicate such broader contractarian use of the words ‘contract’ and ‘contractual’ 
by enclosing them in single quotation marks. 
 78. The current legal literature on incomplete contracting demonstrates that the law 
only responds to contractual incompleteness by invoking reliance, forbearance and a 
narrow interpretation of the existing (though incomplete) substance of the contract.  In 
other words, contractual gap-filling by courts proceeds in a very measured and reluctant 
fashion.  See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of 
Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-72 (1992). 
 79. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 614 (“Ideally, and in its original design, 
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not there when it is not there.  However, we cannot explain how it got 
there when it is there.  We want (and, logically, need) discretion of cor-
porate directors.80  Moreover, as I argue under the absolute director 
primacy model, directorial discretion is absolute and nonreviewable.81
So far then, my answers to the two fundamental questions of corpo-
rate law are as follows: First, we know who controls—namely, directors, 
with absolute primacy.  However, second, when we ask whose inter-
est(s) control(s), we are faced with both a complete ex-ante indetermi-
nability of director behavior and, thus, a complete ex-ante unpredictabil-
ity of director behavior within the absolute director primacy model.  
Those answers may simply suggest the weakness of my model.  Howev-
er, I believe that they accurately reflect (at least, with regard to directori-
al decisionmaking power and its consequences on controlling interests, 
if any) both corporate and corporate law reality. 
  
Thus, one may argue that the current state of our corporate governance 
system is characterized not only by intentional incompleteness, but also 
by an intentional and purposeful refusal to provide any legal mechanism 
of accountability to fill those canyon-wide ‘contractual’ gaps created by 
absolute, nonreviewable directorial discretion.  Such refusal, at the same 
time, also constitutes a decided rejection by corporate law to provide 
model-immanent meaning to macrotheoretical, allocative and distribu-
tive concerns entering the realm of corporate governance.  Thus, it evi-
dences a decided rejection to provide any inner legitimacy or intelligibil-
ity within the domain of either the letter or the spirit of corporate law. 
As a consequence of these (provisionally incomplete) answers to 
the two fundamental questions of corporate governance, I need to look 
somewhere outside the realm of corporate law for something that corpo-
rate law not only presupposes but that is of critical use to corporate law 
(as well as the theoretical models of the firm) in order to allow for the 
 
fiduciary obligation is self-enforcing.”). 
 80. See, e.g., ARROW, supra note 28, at 78 (“If every decision of A is to be re-
viewed by B, then all we have really is a shift in the locus of authority from A to B and 
hence no solution to the original problem.”); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 11; Bain-
bridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 573 (“Neither discretion nor accountability can be 
ignored because both promote values essential to the survival of business organizations.  
Unfortunately, they are ultimately antithetical: one cannot have more of one without 
also having less of the other.  At some point, directors cannot be made more accounta-
ble without undermining their discretionary authority.”) (footnote omitted); Dooley, su-
pra note 6, at 470. 
 81. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
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simple fact that firm investments can be made confidently ex-ante.82  
From all we can tell, these investments are made—daily and literally 
millions of times over,83 and with a good measure of predictive accura-
cy.  Therefore, something currently left unexplained must allow for in-
vestor confidence and economic efficiency ex-ante-investment.84
This “something” I call “protolegal variables.”  With this admitted-
ly open-ended and diffuse
  Some-
thing exists that makes absolute director primacy principled, so that firm 
participants willingly make firm-specific investments despite the lack of 
director accountability ex-post-investment. 
85 label, I try to distill into one category all 
those socio-contextual,86 behavior-oriented and reciprocal87 normative 
implications and foundations of interpersonal cooperation88 which are 
based on expectations and counter-expectations.89
 
 82. Cf. Dorff, supra note 66, at 257 (“To induce investors to buy stock ex ante, 
corporate governance law must be designed to give confidence that managers will sel-
dom cheat and that when they do cheat they will generally be detected and punished.”). 
  I will explain them in 
 83. For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Ex-
change for NYSE-listed companies in 2009 totaled 7,982,926 trading transactions per 
diem, comprising an average of 2,179,775,581 shares traded for a total average consid-
eration of $46,670,638,331.  Facts & Figures: Interactive Viewer, NYSE, 
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=
3002&category=3.  See also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1737. 
 84. Cf. Bainbridge, Competing Concepts, supra note 13, at 80; William A. Klein, 
Criteria for Good Laws of Business Associations, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 13, 15 (2005). 
 85. See Oliver E. Williamson, Calculativeness, Trust and Economic Organization, 
36 J.L. & ECON. 453, 469 (1993) [hereinafter Williamson, Calculativeness] (“If calcula-
tive relations are best described in calculative terms, then diffuse terms, of which trust 
is one, that have mixed meanings should be avoided when possible.”).  Cf. Diego Gam-
betta, Can We Trust Trust?, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE 
RELATIONS 213, 213-14 (Diego Gambetta ed., 1988) (“irritating rhetorical flabbiness”).  
See also Richard A. Epstein, Contract and Trust in Corporate Law: The Case of Corpo-
rate Opportunity, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 5, 10 (1996) (“At some point concrete rules will 
have to give way, or at least share the stage, with other rules of a more general and dif-
fuse nature.”). 
 86. See Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 13. 
 87. Cf. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 159. 
 88. It is interesting to note in this context that economists describe the various 
forms of opportunism and other agency costs related to the firm as “moral hazards.”  
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 748; Meurer, supra note 53, 
at 733-34. 
 89. LUHMANN, LOVE, supra note 51; LUHMANN, RISK, supra note 51; LUHMANN, 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 51; LUHMANN, TRUST, supra note 51; Luhmann, Familiar-
ity, supra note 51, at 97 (“You cannot live without forming expectations with respect to 
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Part IV and V of this Article in more detail.  However, before I do, I 
must explain how and where in the corporate governance process they 
come into play.  Figure 1 illustrates this process schematically. 
 
Figure 1
 
  
The Decisionmaking Black Box 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Almost eighty years after Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means’ seminal 
study,90 I posit that we are still looking at the same basic “black box” I 
mentioned above91
 
contingent events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility of disappoint-
ment. You neglect this because it is a very rare possibility, but also because you do not 
know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent uncertainty and 
to withdraw expectations without having anything with which to replace them.”).  See 
also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796; Miller, supra note 51, at 
641; Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, 
at 410-15. 
 with its still hidden inner magic.  As corporate theor-
ists, we certainly have made progress by determining the designated 
function of the black box within corporate governance—namely, to gen-
erate certain control outputs from a wide range of factual inputs that 
provide (at least, incomplete empirical) answers as to “who control(s)?” 
and “whose interest(s) control(s)?”  It is the core functionality of the 
 90. BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 2. 
 91. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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black box to generate those output determinations in every new context 
of a given corporate reality necessitating an exercise of corporate con-
trol.  However, we have not yet deciphered and explained the precise in-
ner workings of the corporate decisionmaking black box so that we 
could arrive at any genuine measure of predictive accuracy for those 
particularized output determinations.  I posit that we still have no well-
developed idea—at least, not within the framework of corporate law—as 
to how corporate directors will select from a complete, virtually unli-
mited range of options92 and, in particular, how they are incentivized to 
repeatedly select “properly” and to “do the right thing.”93  In other 
words, inputs and outputs are observable.  The rest, in the middle—
which, of course, is the main interest—is not observable.  The magic is 
still hidden.  However, my best guess is that we can begin to explain and 
uncover the magic by focusing on model-critical protolegal variables.  
They may be the hidden catalysts that create intuitive ex-ante determi-
nability for firm participants and that make director behavior sufficiently 
predictable for firm participants to invest and, thus, for the wealth crea-
tion exercise that is the corporate form at work to exist.94
To begin to understand why the middle is so difficult to explain, 
why we still have no well-developed idea as to how corporate directors 
act the way they act (which is usually in a non-opportunistic manner) 
and why they act in such a manner even without any legal constraints as 
part of the motivational picture, one inevitably ends up focusing on ma-
crotheoretical models of the firm.  These, by definition, struggle with the 
firm not only as a non-market, hierarchical structure of wealth creation, 
but predominantly with its overall place in society and with the eternal 
macro-question of corporate law—namely, whether and to what extent 
the corporate entity as an institution of private property and private-party 
ordering in the means of economic production and wealth maximization 
should be subordinated to the legitimate claims of the larger society that 
inextricably embeds its wealth maximization exercise.  This, in turn, 
 
 
 92. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23. 
 93. Cf. Grossman, supra note 53, at 465-66; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 
1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9.  See also Meurer, supra note 53, at 
740 (stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in transaction-
cost-theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a firm gets managers to be 
pure profit maximizers”). 
 94. Note again that protolegal variables may turn out to be “observable, but not 
verifiable.” Cf. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1702; Rock & Wachter, su-
pra note 9, at 1617.  Thus, the magic may, indeed, remain invisible to our eyes. 
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more thoroughly explains why we develop macrotheoretical models of 
the firm in the first place and why this macrotheorectical realm is not 
only of theoretical, but of practical relevance for directorial behavior 
characterized by absolute, unfettered decisionmaking power and discre-
tion. 
 
III. WHY MACROTHEORETICAL MODELS OF THE FIRM? 
Macrotheoretical models of the firm95 are less concerned with the 
inner workings of the firm (i.e., its internal cohesion, adaptability and 
survival as a generator and maximizer of productive output and econom-
ic wealth).96  Instead, they focus on the firm’s characteristics and im-
pacts as (i) a social institution (i.e., a public good),97 and (ii) a generator 
of externalities, both positive (i.e., social benefits) and negative (i.e., so-
cial costs).98  These models exist because no corporation is truly an isl-
and of economic activity,99 rather, it is inextricably embedded in the 
larger context of our societal polity.100  Business corporations not only 
create and maximize wealth (when they are successful), they also distri-
bute wealth101
 
 95. As opposed to “microtheoretical” models of the firm; see supra note 
—by necessity and simultaneously.  Every instance of 
9. 
 96. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396; Millon, supra note 3, at 201-02; Rock & 
Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608. 
 97. Cf. BERLE, JR. & MEANS, supra note 2, at 352-53; Mitchell, Trust and Team, 
supra note 50, at 870; Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 748. 
 98. Cf. Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17; Thomas, supra note 59, at 135. 
 99. Cf. DENNIS H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 84 (1923) (stating that 
firms are “islands of conscious power in this ocean of unconscious co-operation [name-
ly, the market] like lumps of butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk”); George B. 
Richardson, The Organisation of Industry, 82 Econ. J. 883, 883 (1972) (describing 
firms in general as “islands of planned co-ordination in a sea of market relations”). See 
also Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937) (“These, 
then, are the reasons why organisations such as firms exist in a specialised exchange 
economy in which it is generally assumed that the distribution of resources is ‘orga-
nised’ by the price mechanism.  A firm, therefore, consists of the system of relation-
ships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent on an 
entrepreneur.”); Powell, supra note 62, at 297; Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621. 
 100. Cf. Allen, supra note 12, 261, 264-65; Romano, supra note 1, at 924. See also 
John Donne, Meditation XVII, in DEVOTIONS UPON EMERGENT OCCASIONS 107, 108 
(1624) (“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a 
part of the main.”). 
 101. If business corporations are not successful, they, of course, destroy wealth and 
2011] DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 489 
DIRECTOR PRIMACY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE? 
 
wealth creation is, ipso facto, an instance of wealth distribution.102  Cor-
porate governance is the mere structure and mechanism of how those 
simultaneous instances of wealth creation and wealth distribution come 
about.  In my view, all corporate decisionmaking by a board of directors 
logically reduces to (i) allocating existing wealth (productive resources) 
to the corporate endeavor, (ii) setting in motion the processes to create 
future wealth, and (iii) distributing such existing and future wealth 
among the whole range of firm participants (for example, as salaries to 
employees, dividends to stockholders, fees to suppliers, rebates to cus-
tomers, taxes to local, state and federal authorities, etc.).103  Corporate 
law is, thus, part of our system of justice and the rule of law.  It is part of 
our system of private-sector ordering.  Inevitably then, the (apparently, 
for some, “ugly”104
 
distribute losses. 
) problem of socioeconomic and sociopolitical effi-
 102. It is an often underestimated fact that every single board decision does both—
allocating resources and distributing (future) benefits—simultaneously and often with 
allocative and distributive effects to multiple if not (at least, indirectly) all firm partici-
pants.  What I mean here is that it is (too) often overlooked that, in the reality of the 
going-concern operation of the firm, there is no bifurcation whatsoever between the 
time the board acts hiring productive resources in order to create value and the time the 
board acts in order to distribute to the firm’s value participants the cash flows resulting 
from the creation of value.  Every time the board (or upper management) acts, including 
when it hires productive resources, it instantly allocates and distributes currently availa-
ble as well as future cash flows among all firm participants.  Thus, on a daily basis, fu-
ture cash flows are pre-booked, pre-committed and pre-spent—when money comes in, 
some of it (or all of it, or even more than it) has already gone out.  Accordingly, there is 
no factual distinction possible between wealth creation and wealth distribution, as both 
occur simultaneously once the corporation becomes a going concern. 
 103. Cf. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1214-15 (Del. 1996) (“Likewise, busi-
ness decisions are not an abdication of directorial authority merely because they limit a 
board’s freedom of future action. A board which has decided to manufacture bricks has 
less freedom to decide to make bottles. In a world of scarcity, a decision to do one thing 
will commit a board to a certain course of action and make it costly and difficult (in-
deed, sometimes impossible) to change course and do another. This is an inevitable fact 
of life and is not an abdication of directorial duty.”). 
 104. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Clark’s Treatise on Corporate Law: 
Filling Manning’s Empty Towers, 31 J. CORP. L. 599, 604 n.21 (2006).  See also Milton 
Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is To Increase Profits, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Sept. 13, 1970 (arguing that “the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ involves 
the acceptance of the socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, 
are the appropriate way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative 
uses”); Gilson, supra note 58, at 147 n.12 (pointing out that “markets encourage a man-
agement and governance structure that fits the corporation’s business” and that 
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ciency, legitimacy and ultimate justice raises its head.105
A. JURISPRUDENTIAL MACRODICHOTOMIES 
 
Unlike microtheoretical models of the firm, with their focus on the 
interdependent dichotomies between (i) discretion and accountability of 
corporate decisionmaking106 and (ii) market value and societal value as 
controlling backstops for such decisionmaking,107
• Aristotelean notions of rectification (corrective justice) and 
 macrotheoretical 
models of the firm are defined by the following three fundamental ma-
crodichotomies: 
 
“[c]orporate law has nothing to add to the process”).  See also Douglas A. Kysar, Sus-
tainability, Distribution, and the Macroeconomic Analysis of Law, 43 B.C. L. REV. 1, 
22 (2001) (“More than one commentator has speculated that the disappearance of limits 
in macroeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult questions of dis-
tribution.”); Lee, supra note 10, at 575 (“The terms ‘morality’ and ‘justice’ may raise 
red flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.”). 
 105. See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 18 (“As a normative mat-
ter, the overall objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to 
serve the interest of society as a whole. More particularly, the appropriate goal of cor-
porate law is to advance the aggregate welfare of a firm’s shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, and customers without undue sacrifice—and, if possible, with benefit—to 
third parties such as local communities and beneficiaries or the natural environment.  
That is what economists would characterize as the pursuit of overall social efficiency.”); 
Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870 (describing the understanding of corpo-
rate organization in terms of team production not only as a “tale […] of economics 
alone” but also as “to conceive of the corporation as a political institution” and “as a 
social institution”); Pinto, supra note 3, at 257 n.2 (“Because of the importance of pub-
licly traded corporation in society, there are significant issues over the focus of corpo-
rate governance, how power should be allocated within the corporation and the role of 
law and non-legal mechanisms in protecting investors and other stakeholders and allow-
ing those who manage to effectively function.”); Wallman, Understanding, supra note 
10, at 809-10 (concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at maximizing “so-
cietal wealth over the long term”). 
 106. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 84; Blair & Stout, 
Team Production, supra note 5, at 743; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 947-48; Mitchell, 
Trust, supra note 23, at 188-89; Pinto, supra note 3, at 266; Ribstein, supra note 25, at 
198; Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48. 
 107. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 58, at 143 (stating that “the criteria for good corpo-
rate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of share-
holder wealth”).  See also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 599 (describing as a 
critical fact for the intellectual vigor of corporate law that “all of the interesting and 
challenging issues involve the resolution of conflicts between corporate participants”). 
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fairness (distributive justice);108
• market liberalism (private liberty) and utilitarianism (social 
utility);
 
109
• the dialectics between the private/internal/market and the 
public/external/regulatory spheres of institutional power 
over the governance of the corporation (market and poli-
ty).
 and 
110
Arguably, these macrodichotomies shape both the substance and the 
objectives of corporate law (as they also shape the substance and objec-
tives of all other fields of law that we consider to be ‘private law’).  
Each of them is replicated, en miniature, in the interdependence between 
the two microdichotomies of corporate governance—namely, (i) the 
fundamental agency problem of managerial primacy (the allocation of 
control with, and the resultant discretion of, corporate decisionmak-
ers)
 
111 and shareholder/stakeholder primacy (the allocation of controlling 
property and/or contract rights with, and the resultant accountability to, 
specific firm participants),112 and (ii) shareholder wealth (maximum 
market value) and stakeholder welfare (maximum societal value).113
 
  
Descriptively, these three macrodichotomies relate to each other as set 
forth in Figure 2. 
 
 
 108. See, e.g., Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort 
Law of Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 194-95 (2000); Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective 
Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 349, 349 (2002) [hereinafter Weinrib, Cor-
rective Justice]; Ernest J. Weinrib, Liberty, Community, and Corrective Justice, 1 CAN. 
J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 3, 4-5 (1988); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1859, 1868, 1890-92 (2000). 
 109. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1396; Romano, supra note 1, at 926. 
 110. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 549; Bratton, supra note 3, at 
202; Richter, supra note 5, at 177 (describing Douglass North’s concept of new institu-
tional economics of history as aiming “at a general theory of the interaction between 
polity and economy”). 
 111. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 743; Shleifer & 
Vishny, supra note 4, at 740-48. 
 112. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 58, at 143 (stating that “the criteria for good corpo-
rate law are limited to a single overriding goal: facilitating the maximization of share-
holder wealth”); Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58, at 18 (“As a normative matter, 
the overall objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to serve 
the interest of society as a whole.”). 
 113. Cf. Allen, supra note 12, at 264-65; Fisch, supra note 10, at 639-40. 
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Figure 2
 
 
Plotting Jurisprudential Macrodichotomies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
First, the firm can be seen as merely a result of private-party initia-
tive and market competition.  Accordingly, corporate law, as the enabl-
ing framework114 for such private-party initiative and its participation in 
the marketplace, is a means to support a free-enterprise system where 
private parties should be at liberty to order their economic affairs as they 
see fit and without any regulatory intervention.115  Collectively, all such 
incidents of private-party contractarian and/or transactional ordering 
combine to create—at least, in theory—Adam Smith’s “invisible hand of 
the market.”116
This jurisprudential source of liberalism (its battle cry is free-
dom),
  In other words, market forces control. 
117 however, immediately needs to be juxtaposed with utilitarian-
ism (the battle cry of which is efficiency).118
 
 114. Allen, supra note 9, at 1400; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608, 1617. 
  Under utilitarianism, hie-
 115. Cf. Allen, supra note 9, at 1396. 
 116. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS 3 (1776) (Cannan ed. 1904), available at http://www.econlib.org/library/ 
Smith/smWN13.html.  See Rock & Wachter, supra note 5, at 1697. 
 117. Or human liberty in order to fend off the great evil of an oppressive, leviathan 
state.  See, e.g., Allen, supra note 9, at 1396. 
 118. See, e.g., Wright, supra note 108, at 1868-71.  See also Lawrence E. Mitchell, 
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rarchical forces control.  Going back to Jeremy Bentham’s definition of 
social utility as the principle of achieving the greatest possible happiness 
for the greatest possible number of people,119 the corporate entity can al-
so be subjected to general welfare concerns (i.e., it can be regarded as a 
vehicle to foster the common good).120  The problem of social utility of 
corporations is at the core of one of the three standard agency (cost) 
problems created by the corporate entity—namely, the interest conflicts 
between firm participants and outside parties.121  Since Ronald Coase’s 
famous explanation of the nature of firms in 1937 (as further elaborated 
by Oliver Williamson in his “markets and hierarchies” research pro-
gram122),123
 
Vulnerability and Efficiency (of What?), 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 153, 153-54, 159 (2005) 
(“The obvious candidate to serve as a metric of good corporate law is the efficient pro-
duction of goods and services.”). 
 we know that the corporate structuration must be eternally 
 119. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND 
LEGISLATION 9 (1780) (Pickering 1823).  See also Wright, supra note 108, at 1868. 
 120. Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58 (“As a normative matter, the overall 
objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to serve the interest 
of society as a whole.”); Thomas, supra note 59, at 135 (“It strikes me that the overall 
goal of good corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for them-
selves and the economy in a manner that does not inflict uncompensated negative exter-
nalities upon third parties.”). 
 121. See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 5, at 22.  The other two standard agen-
cy (cost) problems created by the corporate entity are between managers and investors 
(as discussed supra) and between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
Id. 
 122. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND 
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975); Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Or-
ganization, 4 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 65, 88 (1988) (arguing the existence of “three generic 
forms of governance – market, hybrid, and hierarchy”).  See also Bernard Baudry & 
David Gindis, The V-Network Form: Economic Organization and the Theory of the 
Firm 1 (October 10, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=795244; Powell, supra 
note 62, at 297.  See also Meurer, supra note 53, at 729-30; Rock & Wachter, supra 
note 5, at 1631. 
 123. Coase, supra note 99, at 386, 388, 393 (asking “in view of the fact that it is 
usually argued that coordination will be done by the price mechanism, why is such or-
ganization necessary?” and then explaining that “[the] firm …consists of the system of 
relationships which comes into existence when the direction of resources is dependent 
on an entrepreneur.”).  See COX & HAZEN, supra note 3, at 40; Allen, supra note 9, at 
1398; Dooley, supra note 6, at 464; Mark Granovetter, Business Groups, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY 454, 454 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg 
eds., 2000); Meurer, supra note 53, at 737; Powell, supra note 62, at 296-97; Rock & 
Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621.  See also Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The 
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stuck in this first macrodichotomy between market/freedom and hie-
rarchy/efficiency.  The corporation shelters private-party entrepreneurial 
activity from market forces and higher transaction costs by providing an 
efficient vehicle for pooling investments and subjecting those to a cen-
tral command-and-control structure.124
A second macrodichotomy exists between the Aristotelean notions 
of corrective justice (its battle cry is rectification)
 
125 and concerns of dis-
tributive justice (the battle cry of which is fairness).126  In Book V of his 
Nicomachean Ethics,127 Aristotle formulated these two concepts of jus-
tice that remain central to contemporary theories of private law.128  Cor-
rective (or commutative129 or interactive130) justice focuses on bipolar 
relations and correlativity.131
 
Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. 
POL. ECON. 691, 692 (1986) (differentiating between specific rights and residual rights 
in order to explain firm boundaries); Oliver D. Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and 
the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1119 (1990) (setting forth a framework 
for addressing the question of “when transactions should be carried out within the firm 
and when through the market”). 
  Fiduciary duties owed by directors to the 
corporation provide an example of such bipolar relations within corpo-
rate governance.  Fiduciary duties are seen as delictual obligations (i.e., 
 124. See also Bainbridge, Competing Concepts, supra note 13, at 81; Bainbridge, 
Primacy, supra note 12, at 555; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 759; Rock 
& Wachter, supra note 9, at 1617. Cf. ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF EXTREMES 103 
(1994) (describing how intellectuals and policy makers early in the 20th century already 
observed that an economy dominated by huge corporations made nonsense of the term 
‘perfect competition’). 
 125. Keating, supra note 108, at 195; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 
350. 
 126. Or equality (which both are the same word in Greek).  See Weinrib, Corrective 
Justice, supra note 108, at 349.  See also Keating, supra note 108, at 200. 
 127. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book V, Chapters 2-4 (W. D. Ross trans., 
Clarendon Press, 1908) (384 B.C.E.) available at http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/ 
publications/Projects/digitexts/aristotle/nicomachean_ethics/book05.html. 
 128. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349. 
 129. Cees Maris, A ≠ A: Or, Freaky Justice , 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1152-53 
(2010). 
 130. Wright, supra note 108, at 1883. 
 131. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53, 66-67 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); Keating, supra note 
108, at 197; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 351; Ernest J. Weinrib, 
Correlativity, Personality, and the Emerging Consensus on Corrective Justice, 2 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 107, 110, 117 (2001); Weinrib, supra note 108, at 5. 
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their breach resonates in tort, not in contract).132  The basic idea is that 
parties to bipolar relations have an original, notional equality relative to 
their transactions/interactions with each other.133  If one party breaches 
such state of equality, liability of that party is necessary to rectify the 
transactional/interactive injustice inflicted to the other party.134  Thus, 
corrective justice is about the restoration of the parties’ original equality 
relative to their transaction/interaction.135
Distributive justice applies to multipolar relations.
 
136  An example 
in corporate governance is the obligation of directors to act in the best 
interest of the corporation, which requires allocative and distributive de-
cisions with regard to all productive factors involved in the corporation 
as a whole.  Principles of distributive justice are normative principles 
designed to allocate goods in limited supply relative to their demand by 
various constituents.137  The main concern is fair allocation and distribu-
tion of resources and wealth.138  In Aristotelean terms, each party shall 
receive according to her due.139  Thus, the relative merit of each party in 
a multipolar relationship (i.e., their proportional equality) matters.140
 
 132. See, e.g., ENEA v. Superior Court, 34 Cal. Rptr. 3d 513, 519 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2005) (describing fiduciary duties as “delictual” duties “imposed by law” and that “their 
breach sounds in tort”); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fidu-
ciary Obligation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 887.  But see, e.g., Alces, supra note 42, at 244 
(“All fiduciary relationships are, at some level, contractual.”); id. at 270-71 (“Even 
though all fiduciary relationships are contractual, not all contractual relationships are 
fiduciary.”). 
  
Principles of distributive justice are thought to operate independent of 
any individual interactions between the parties.  The very nature of the 
corporation as a vehicle to pool firm-specific investments from a wide 
range of firm participants is obviously multipolar.  Therefore, distribu-
tive justice concerns are immediately implicated.  Nonetheless, the gist 
 133. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349. 
 134. Id.; Wright, supra note 108, at 1891. 
 135. Cf. Wright, supra note 108, at 1891. 
 136. Weinrib, supra note 131, at 117; Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, 
at 351-52. 
 137. Cf. Keating, supra note 108, at 200; Wright, supra note 108, at 1890. 
 138. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349; Weinrib, supra note 108, 
at 4; Wright, supra note 108, at 1890. 
 139. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349; Maris, supra note 129, at 
1152.  Similarly, distributive justice requires that equal cases be treated equally and un-
equal cases be treated unequally.  See id. at 1133-34, 1152. 
 140. Weinrib, Corrective Justice, supra note 108, at 349. 
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of corporate law dealing with the microtheoretical problems of the firm, 
namely the two fundamental questions of corporate governance dis-
cussed above, operates in paradigms of bipolar relations (i.e., in para-
digms of corrective justice).  Only in the rare case of an unignorable 
third relation (e.g., a hostile takeover predator) has corporate law been 
forced to explicitly acknowledge multipolarity and to deal (or, shall we 
say, struggle) with its fallout.141
Both macrodichotomies discussed so far combine into a third, over-
arching macrodichotomy that has been developed by two main repre-
sentatives of new institutional economics (“NIE”): Oliver Williamson, 
on the one hand, who established the field of transaction cost economics 
(“TCE”), which may be viewed as a microeconomic study of markets 
and firms,
 
142 and Douglass North, on the other hand, who established the 
field of new institutional economics of history (“NIEH”), which may be 
viewed as a macroeconomic analysis of markets and firms.143
 
 141. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955-56 (Del. 
1985); Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc. 571 A.2d 1140, 1143-44 (Del. 1989).  
Compare Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 
(Del. 1985).  In general, see, e.g., Margaret M. Blair, Reforming Corporate Gover-
nance: What History Can Teach Us, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 1-3 (2004); Lyman John-
son, Individual and Collective Sovereignty in the Corporate Enterprise, 92 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2215, 2245-48 (1992); Lyman Johnson, New Approaches to Corporate Law, 50 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1713, 1715-17 (1993); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Ar-
guments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1203-04 (2002). 
  TCE, in 
 142. See, e.g., WILLIAMSON, ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS, supra note 122; OLIVER E. 
WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Oliver E. William-
son, Introduction to THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 3 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1991); Oliver E. Wil-
liamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics Meets 
Posnerian Law and Economics, 149 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 99 (1993); Oliver 
E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Precursors, in REGULATION, 
DEREGULATION, REREGULATION: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Claude Ménard & Mi-
chel Ghertman eds., 2009); Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics and Or-
ganization Theory, in ORGANIZATION THEORY: FROM CHESTER BARNARD TO THE 
PRESENT AND BEYOND (Oliver E. Williamson ed. 1995); Oliver E. Williamson, Why 
Law, Economics, and Organization?, in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS 
BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS (Francesco Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005).  See 
also Allen, supra note 9, at 1399; Richter, supra note 5, at 174-75. 
 143. See, e.g., LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 
AND AMERICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH (1971); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, STRUCTURE AND 
CHANGE IN ECONOMIC HISTORY (1981); DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, 
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the Williamsonian tradition, focuses on arrangements made essentially 
between two actors144 and deals with the transfer or administration of 
what economists call “private goods.”145  Those goods (e.g., a contract) 
are seen as the result of individual action.146  TCE mainly ignores proto-
legal variables (e.g., norms, customs, mores, or traditions) as unalterable 
givens since they are located at the top level of social analysis, namely 
the “social embeddedness level” at which institutions “change very 
slowly—on the order of centuries or millennia.”147  Contrastingly, NIEH 
concentrates on the “formal and informal institutional constraints which 
control the behavior of more than two actors.”148  Its focus is the provi-
sion or administration of what economists call “public goods.”149  Such 
goods (e.g., a corporation) are the result of collective action.150  NIEH 
explicitly accounts for protolegal variables since the “public good” is 
seen as “nothing more nor less than the comprehensive system of cogni-
tive and moral beliefs called ideology.”151
 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (James Alt & Douglass C. 
North eds., 1990); DOUGLASS C. NORTH & ROBERT PAUL THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE 
WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY (1973); Douglass C. North, Government 
and the Cost of Exchange, 44 J. ECON. HIST. 255 (1984); Douglass C. North, Institu-
tional Change and Economic Growth, 31 J. ECON. HIST. 118 (1971); Douglass C. North, 
Structure and Performance: The Task of Economic History, 16 J. ECON. LITERATURE 
963 (1978) [hereinafter North, Structure and Performance]; Douglass C. North & Ro-
bert Paul Thomas, The Rise and Fall of the Manorial System: A Theoretical Model, 31 
J. ECON. HIST. 777 (1971).  See also Richter, supra note 5, at 173-76. 
  Protolegal variables thus im-
pact (if not control, as argued under the absolute director primacy mod-
 144. Oliver E. Williamson, The Evolving Science of Organization, 149 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 36, 56 (1993) (“Transaction cost economics mainly works out a 
dyadic set-up.”). 
 145. Richter, supra note 5, at 178. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Oliver E. Williamson, The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking 
Ahead, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 595, 596 (2000).  The social embeddedness level, ac-
cording to Williamson, includes informal institutions, customs, tradition, norms and re-
ligion.  Id. at 596.  See also Richter, supra note 5, at 178 (“norms, customs, mores, tra-
dition and so forth”). 
 148. Richter, supra note 5, at 178. 
 149. Id.  See also Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: 
The Structural Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1643, 1657 (1996); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Understanding Norms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 
177, 198-99 (1999) [hereinafter Mitchell, Norms]. 
 150. Richter, supra note 5, at 178. 
 151. North, Structure and Performance, supra note 143, at 973. 
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el) the provision and administration of public goods. 
In the light of such macrodichotomy, it seems possible to say the 
corporation is both a private good (or the result of a concert of private 
goods—namely, “contracts”) and a public good.  However, given the 
necessary multitude of productive resources pooled within the firm, the 
more essential nature of a corporation appears to be multipolar, thus, as 
a public good.152
B. NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES 
 
Macrotheoretical models of the firm have another very simple fac-
tual raison d’être: every productive endeavor by humans—as strictly 
secondary producers—generates costs.153  Indeed, from a holistic, plane-
tary perspective, modern humans are a frivolity of nature.154  All modern 
human activity is ultimately exogenous and constitutes a net loss of nat-
ural resources compared to the ex-ante state of human activity.155  We 
consume enormous amounts of high-grade, low-entropy energy and re-
sources extracted from the ecosphere in order to produce and maintain 
something (including the consumption of matter-energy in the fairly 
small amounts we inevitably need to constantly sustain and regenerate 
ourselves).156  In total amounts, these exercises of human production and 
maintenance result in a smaller total amount of available low-entropy 
matter-energy than was available on this planet before its transformation 
and consumption for purposes of human production and maintenance.157
 
 152. In this regard, the firm not only resembles a nexus of contractual or quasi-
contractual arrangements linking rational firm participants but a social institution within 
which firm participants form cooperative relationships for purposes of production and 
value creation.  See, e.g., Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870; Blair & 
Stout, Team Production, supra note 5, at 748. 
  
 153. Cf. Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17. 
 154. Cf. Kysar, supra note 104, at 14 (“[A]lthough animals do grow in size and spe-
cies do evolve in complexity, in actuality their physical growth and adaptation exacts a 
higher cost in terms of pure matter-energy than their new forms represent.”). 
 155. Cf. HERMAN E. DALY, BEYOND GROWTH: THE ECONOMICS OF SUSTAINABLE 
DEVELOPMENT 35 (1996) (“The macroeconomy is an open subsystem of the ecosystem 
and is totally dependent upon it, both as a source for inputs of low-entropy matter-
energy and as a sink for outputs of high-entropy matter-energy.”); Kysar, supra note 
104, at 35; Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17 n.57. 
 156. Cf. Kysar, supra note 104, at 22. 
 157. Cf. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Problem, 
reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS 75, 80 (Herman E. 
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At the same time, these exercises of human production and maintenance 
also result in high-entropy outputs that the ecosystem has to assume and 
regenerate.  Thus, in terms of total amounts of energy and resources 
available, modern man’s existence is always wasteful and, thus, never 
genuinely productive.158
Correspondingly, any perceived “wealth” we are generating in ab-
solute terms is the result of destroying a much larger amount of natural 
capital.  To make it look good (and to ignore that we consume and de-
stroy the only natural capital available to us faster and more systemati-
cally than our natural capital has time and resources to regenerate and to 
continue maintaining us), the trick is to simply ignore and not account 
for the costs that are the necessary and principal ingredient in order to 
generate “wealth.”  Focusing on the “wealth” so produced, and simulta-
neously ignoring, or at least, downplaying, the associated costs of wealth 
production, results in a virtual, reality-denying net gain, rather than in 
the actual and very real total loss that modern human “wealth” creation 
inevitably generates.
  “Wealth/value” and “wealth/value creation” 
are therefore mere fictions fabricated by human beings. 
159
Thus, the inescapable problems of all modern human activity, in-
cluding in the form of the corporate endeavor, are negative externalities 
 
 
Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993) (explaining that “the cost of any biological or 
economic enterprise is always greater than the product”); Kysar, supra note 104, at 25. 
 158. And we are starting to run on empty, i.e., to exceed the “carrying capacity” of 
the only ecosystem available to us.  Kenneth E. Boulding, The Economics of the Com-
ing Spaceship Earth (1966), reprinted in VALUING THE EARTH: ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, 
ETHICS 297, 303 (Herman E. Daly & Kenneth N. Townsend eds., 1993) (“The closed 
economy of the future might similarly be called the ‘spaceman’ economy, in which the 
earth has become a single spaceship, without unlimited reservoirs of anything, either for 
extraction or for pollution, and in which, therefore, man must find his place in a cyclical 
ecological system which is capable of continuous reproduction of material form even 
though it cannot escape having inputs of energy.”); Kysar, supra note 104, at 27 (“Eco-
logical economists, however, believe that humanity has now moved to the ‘spaceman 
economy’ . . . , in which human productive capacity has outstripped the carrying capaci-
ty of the earth; that is, the binding constraint on material throughput is no longer our 
capacity to produce, but the earth’s capacity to generate resource inputs and absorb 
waste outputs.”) (footnote omitted). 
 159. See Kysar, supra note 104, at 29 (“Current national accounting measures pro-
duce a variety of results that would strike noneconomists as odd. . . . Social as well as 
ecological costs frequently appear as gains under GNP accounting.”); Sheehy, supra 
note 59, at 17 n.57. 
500 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
(i.e., social costs).160  As has been pointed out some time ago, “[o]ne of 
the most fateful errors of our age is the belief that ‘the problem of pro-
duction’ has been solved.”161  Indeed, “[a]ll economic activity must nec-
essarily involve a step, however small, toward the exhaustion of availa-
ble energy.”162  Thus, “[i]nfinite growth in a finite environment is an 
obvious impossibility.”163
Against this backdrop, shareholder wealth can no longer be equated 
with social welfare—nor can firm value any longer be equated with so-
cial value.
 
164  They are dichotomous.  The simple reason for such di-
chotomy is that firm value is inevitably associated with social costs.  
Firms create perceived “value” to a large extent by externalizing the 
negative aspects of their value production exercises to outside factors 
(third parties, the environment, etc.).165
 
 160. See Thomas, supra note 59, at 135 (“It strikes me that the overall goal of good 
corporate law should be to assist private parties to create wealth for themselves and the 
economy in a manner that does not inflict uncompensated negative externalities upon 
third parties.”).  The concept of externalities was introduced in economic discourse by 
Arthur Pigou in 1920.  ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 149-179 
(1920) (discussing the concept of externalities in markets).  See also R.H. Coase, The 
Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 28-29 (1960); Kysar, supra note 104, at 9; 
Sheehy, supra note 59, at 17 n.57.  For a general discussion of the concept of externali-
ties, see, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 77-109 
(2004). 
  The greater the concentration of 
economic power of a firm, in particular in the form of the modern Berle-
 161. E.F. SCHUMACHER, SMALL IS BEAUTIFUL – ECONOMICS AS IF PEOPLE 
MATTERED 1 (1973) (Hartley & Marks 1999). 
 162. Kysar, supra note 104, at 15.  See also Georgescu-Roegen, supra note 157, at 
85 (“Every time we produce a Cadillac, we irrevocably destroy an amount of low entro-
py that could otherwise be used for producing a plow or a spade.  In other words, every 
time we produce a Cadillac, we do it at the cost of decreasing the number of human 
lives in the future.  Economic development through industrial abundance may be a 
blessing for us now and for those who will be able to enjoy it in the near future, but it is 
definitely against the interest of the human species as a whole, if its interest is to have a 
lifespan as long as it is compatible with its dowry of low entropy.”). 
 163. SCHUMACHER, supra note 161, at 33.  See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of 
the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968) (“Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked 
into a system that compels him to increase his herd without limit—in a world that is li-
mited.  Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each pursing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons.  Freedom in a com-
mons brings ruin to all.”).  Cf. Kysar, supra note 104, at 22. 
 164. Cf. Allen, supra note 12, at 264-65; Fisch, supra note 10, at 639-40; Ribstein, 
supra note 31, at 1433-34. 
 165. Coase, supra note 160, at 1. 
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Means corporation, the larger the potential for negative externalities 
(i.e., social costs).166  Many of those externalities remain unaccounted 
for and, in particular, unreported.167
The three fundamental macrodichotomies discussed above, and the 
eternal problem of externalities, not only affect but define the acquired 
interest preferences of our libertarian, free-enterprise-oriented society,
 
168 
and, thus, of our private law, corporate law, and law of corporate gover-
nance.  Collectively, they can be defined as protolegal per se.  In other 
words, we have reached the macrotheoretical core of directorial deci-
sionmaking in the absence of any effective legal constraints under our 
American corporate law.  This macrotheoretical core of protolegal con-
cerns provides American corporate law with a principal range of ulti-
mately dialectic jurisprudential foundations that insolubly remain in con-
flict.  They therefore, must find their way, and somehow translate, into 
the individual moral compass of every human being, including, as is of 
interest here, the respective individual moral compasses of corporate di-
rectors.169  This is where things inevitably become slippery170 and where 
we move beyond the outer fringes of, and transcend, those models of the 
firm that are artificially centered around assumptions (or test conditions) 
of rational choice, zero transaction costs, perfect information and ob-
servable and verifiable calculative behavior of individual (including di-
rectorial) actors.171
 
 166. Cf. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 3, at 310. 
 
 167. See, e.g., Michael R. Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Promoting Efficient 
Corporate Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 115, 
128-36 (2009); Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1999); Cynthia A. Williams 
& John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-American 
Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 (2005). 
 168. Cf. O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 754; Klein, supra note 84, at 
16.  The classical and then neoclassical economic position is that the political, economic 
and legal systems need to provide (i) strong legal protection of the entrepreneur’s prop-
erty right to own and control productive assets, as well as (ii) strict limits on the power 
of state actors to regulate and control economic activity.  See, e.g., Harold Demsetz, The 
Theory of the Firm Revisited, in THE NATURE OF THE FIRM: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND 
DEVELOPMENT 159, 159-60 (Oliver E. Williamson & Sidney G. Winter eds., 1993). 
 169. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12 (“internal gyroscope”). 
 170. Cf. Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
1697, 1699 (1996); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. 
 171. See, e.g., Demsetz, supra note 168, at 161 (“The only management task that 
seems to remain, and which is the focus of attention in the firm of traditional price 
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IV. THE MACROTHEORETICAL CORE: NORMS AND  
SELF-ENFORCING CONTRACTS 
Pursuant to the absolute director primacy model, directorial deci-
sionmaking power is absolute.172
By this, I mean the following: economists, simply but profoundly 
(and both in equal measures), explain individual economic choice and 
behavior dialectically as the confrontation of preferences or tastes and 
  Directors have complete discretion to 
make corporate decisions by fiat and without any legal accountability for 
the substance of their decisions (as long as there is no implication of 
self-interest).  Directorial behavior based on unrestricted power is, thus, 
completely opportunistic.  This represents the core dilemma of the abso-
lute director primacy model and requires an inquiry into the protolegal 
realm of directorial behavior. 
 
theory, is the selection of profit-maximizing quantities of outputs and inputs.  But, since 
the required information for doing this is also freely at hand, and the required calcula-
tions are costless to make, the model strips management of any meaningful productivity 
in the performance of even these tasks.  The cost of maximizing is ignored or implicitly 
assumed to be zero.  De facto, the resources that might be required to make maximizing 
decisions are treated as if they are not scarce.”) (footnote omitted) (emphasis in origi-
nal); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 596; Ripken, supra note 33, at 165; Sheehy, 
supra note 59, at 22.  See also ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 53-55 (1990) (summarizing the 
assumptions underlying neoclassical economic theory, including (i) that economic ac-
tors always behave rationally and in a self-interested manner, and (ii) that economic ac-
tors have complete and perfect information available in their pursuit of economic op-
portunities); North, Structure and Performance, supra note 143, at 964 (summarizing 
the same assumptions as “(1) perfectly competitive markets, (2) perfectly specified and 
costlessly enforced property rights, (3) neutral government, and (4) unchanging 
tastes.”).  The artifice of those test conditions (as well as their cumulative effect) has, of 
course, been famously parodied by economist and Nobel laureate George Stigler in his 
Conference Handbook.  George J. Stigler, The Conference Handbook, 85 J. POL. ECON. 
441 (1977).  According to his Handbook, all we need to say here for support of the 
point made above is “9-13-14-16-23-24-30” which numerical labels stand for, respec-
tively: “The conclusions change if you introduce uncertainty.”  “The market cannot, of 
course, deal satisfactorily with that externality.”  “But what if transaction costs are not 
zero?”  “Of course, if you allow for the investment in human capital, the entire picture 
changes.”  “The motivation of the agents in this theory is so narrowly egotistic that it 
cannot possibly explain the behavior of real people.”  “The flabby economic actor in 
this impressionistic model should be replaced by the utility-maximizing individual.”  
“The paper is rigidly confined by the paradigm of neoclassical economics, so large parts 
of urgent reality are outside its comprehension.” 
 172. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
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opportunities.173
Obviously, this is the “slippery”
  If a director is faced with limitless opportunities (at 
least, in principle), any attempt at modeling directorial behavior with 
sufficient predictive ability requires the study of directorial prefe-
rences—namely, what they are, how they work and how such preferen-
tial system underlying directorial behavior comes about in the first 
place.  Given the apparent standardization, selective restriction and, 
thus, decisional discipline of directorial behavior in the face of a limit-
less range of opportunities in the real world of corporate practice, we 
will also need to study whether there exists a preferential phenomenolo-
gy.  Arguably, there must be a common core of protolegal implications 
and foundations of interpersonal cooperation that not only applies to di-
rectorial decisionmaking but that repeatedly produces like outputs from 
similar inputs so that we can arrive at explanations and models with (at 
least, some) predictive accuracy—and without operating this process in 
a black box. 
174 realm of (supposedly) “ugly”175
 
 173. See, e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1725; North, Structure and 
Performance, supra note 143, at 963. 
 
 174. Posner, supra note 170, at 1699 (“The concept of a ‘norm’ is slippery, and 
scholars use it in different ways.”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9 (asking 
“how can we gain a firm grasp on such soft and slippery concepts” as honor, integrity, 
trustworthiness and responsibility). 
 175. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 104, at 604 n.21.  Cf. Friedman, supra note 
104 (arguing that “the doctrine of ‘social responsibility’ involves the acceptance of the 
socialist view that political mechanisms, not market mechanisms, are the appropriate 
way to determine the allocation of scarce resources to alternative uses”); Gilson, supra 
note 58, at 147 (pointing out that “markets encourage a management and governance 
structure that fits the corporation’s business” and that “[c]orporate law has nothing to 
add to the process”).  But cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 58 (“As a normative 
matter, the overall objective of corporate law—as any branch of law—is presumably to 
serve the interest of society as a whole.”); Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 
870 (describing the understanding of corporate organization in terms of team production 
not only as a “tale […] of economics alone” but also as “to conceive of the corporation 
as a political institution” and “as a social institution”); Wallman, Understanding, supra 
note 10, at 809-10 (concluding that corporate governance must be aimed at maximizing 
“societal wealth over the long term”).  To me, it is not clear what should be “ugly” 
about this problem, other than that it perhaps taints the (perceived or aspired) purity and 
sanctity of corporate theoretical models.  I would simply argue that a pure (i.e., non-
normative) corporate law (or any law for that matter) does not—and, because it is a 
complete human fiction anyhow, logically cannot—exist.  The perceived ‘ugliness’ 
may, therefore, have more to do with personal attitudes and preferences (and I mean 
this only descriptively); some observers simply may “get real ‘squirrelly,’” Lawrence 
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normative research.176  However, norms do matter.177  Without an effec-
tive external (legal) constraint on directorial decisionmaking, it seems 
necessary to explain the phenomenon of general investor confidence ex-
ante-investment in the face of absent director accountability ex-post-
investment by “something” else—namely, a repetitive internalization of 
normative standards into directorial preferences with resulting standar-
dized, normative decisional outputs.  In other words, internal values ma-
nifested by the decisionmaking choices of directors made over and over 
again (i.e., by personal preferences) drive directorial behavior.178  Not 
only then, do directors have preferences to adhere to normative stan-
dards, but their preferences affect aggregate behavior in equilibrium.179  
They coagulate into normative, protolegal variables that could help us 
understand and explain why corporate governance works without corpo-
rate law constraints.  Moreover, since the protolegal realm is significant-
ly larger and richer than what has been—or, theoretically, can be—
distilled down from it into the legal vessels of corporate governance, 
norms must have the central role (i.e., not just a supplementary role vis-
à-vis corporate law) in achieving the objective of ex-ante determinability 
of directorial behavior in the absence of ex-post-investment accountabili-
ty constraints.180
Put differently, one may argue that everything within corporate go-
vernance (magically)
 
181
 
Raful, What Balance in Legal Education Means to Me: A Dissenting View, 60 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 135, 135 (2010), when they hear what must sound to them as being “diffuse” and 
“confusing” at best (cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 469) or as being 
“new age stuff” at worst (cf. Raful, supra).  See also Kysar, supra note 104, at 22 
(“More than one commentator has speculated that the disappearance of limits in ma-
croeconomics serves as a theoretical expedient to avoid difficult questions of distribu-
tion.”); Lee, supra note 10, at 575 (“The terms ‘morality’ and ‘justice’ may raise red 
flags for readers skeptical of deontology and inclined toward consequentialism.”); 
Posner, supra note 170, at 1699 (“Norms are fuzzy.”).  See also Mitchell, Norms, supra 
note 149, at 203 (“Norms are fuzzy because people are fuzzy and life is fuzzy.”) (foot-
note omitted). 
 works by itself and the law can sit back and stay 
 176. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 596. 
 177. John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2151, 2175 (2001). 
 178. Cf. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1726. 
 179. Id. at 1726 . 
 180. Cf. id. at 1720. 
 181. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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out of it182 since “we are blissfully in Nash equilibrium.”183  Instead of a 
corporate reality of opportunistic directorial shirking as the norm, we get 
a corporate reality of directorial diligence, fairness, efficiency and com-
petence as the norm because directors are committed to, and simply ap-
ply, their own, internalized normative agenda to the task at hand (i.e., 
making decisions in good faith and the reasonable belief that they are in 
the best interest of the corporation).184  In other words, corporate direc-
tors are “good”185 Macbeths whose fiduciary obligation is entirely self-
enforcing.186
The service and the loyalty I owe, 
In doing it, pays itself.  Your highness’ part 
Is to receive our duties: and our duties 
Are, to your throne and state, children and servants; 
Which do but what they should, by doing every thing 
Safe toward your love and honour.
 
 
187
 
 182. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 12, at 800 (“[T]he law played a relatively minor 
role in the evolution of board structure and behavior . . . .”); Robert B. Thompson, Cor-
porate Law Criteria: Law’s Relation to Private Ordering, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 95, 99 
(2005) (“[L]aw defers to other regulators of human behavior when . . . alternative regu-
lators have a relative advantage. . . . Law is humble.”).  See also Gilson, supra note 58, 
at 147 (“The point is that markets encourage a management and governance structure 
that fits the corporation’s business.  Corporate law has nothing to add to the process.”); 
Mitchell, supra note 118 (“Law has its limits.”); id. at 165 (“Perhaps the best corporate 
law is no law at all.”). 
 
 183. Bruce Chapman, Trust, Economic Rationality, and the Corporate Fiduciary 
Obligation, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 547, 586 (1993).  In game theory, a Nash equilibrium 
designates a state in which no player can any longer improve her personal outcome/pay-
off through unilateral changes in her chosen game strategy.  Id. at 586 n.74. 
 184. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723.  See also Cooter, supra note 
149, at 1661-63; Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149, at 197. 
 185. I am talking about the beginning of Shakespeare’s Macbeth, when the prota-
gonist is bravely and unselfishly leading the Scottish defensive forces against the Nor-
wegian intruders under Sweno, the King of Norway, and the original “Thane of Caw-
dor,” a Scottish defector and traitor fighting alongside the Norwegians.  At such time, 
Macbeth is not besieged by the lust for power (which we often euphemistically call 
“control”) and greed (ditto: “wealth maximization”)—though Shakespeare already la-
bels him “Bellona’s bridegroom” (i.e., as the husband of the goddess of war and as ap-
parently already having replaced Mars, the god of war). 
 186. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 614. 
 187. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act I sc. IV.  Macbeth is addressing Duncan, 
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If only we could find out how corporate directors attain and apply 
their respective moral compasses; how they become and stay good self-
enforcing Macbeths; and whether all of that indeed happens in today’s 
corporate reality.  We certainly are trying to figure this out, as the “slip-
pery” realm of normative research is already under intense investiga-
tion188—both in the economic literature on norms in organizations 
(usually rubricated under the heading of “self-enforcing” or “self-
governing” contracts),189 and in the focus of legal academia on the co-
existence of (corporate) law and norms and the latter’s influence on 
(and, maybe, over) the former (the so-called “law and norms” litera-
ture).190
It certainly is already possible to come up with a (perhaps, neces-
sarily eclectic) list of what could be called “protolegal prolegomena of 
directorial accountability” that all seem part and parcel of the preferen-
tial phenomenology of “good” director conduct.  Many of such prole-
gomena are concepts that, unsurprisingly, have become heavily reflected 
within corporate law (indeed, within many other fields of private law).  
The list includes (without limitation): 
 
• trust191 and trustworthiness;192
 
King of Scotland, after leading the Scottish forces to victory during the battle at Fife.  
Duncan is immensely grateful and states that “[m]ore is thy due than more than all can 
pay” (to which Macbeth responds the above).  Id.  Banquo, a Scottish general who 
fought alongside Macbeth, similarly responds to Duncan’s gratitude (which includes 
promises of wealth and honor within the King’s embrace) with notions of duty, humility 
and selflessness: “There if I grow, The harvest is your own.”  Id. 
 
 188. Cf. Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149, at 179. 
 189. See, e.g., Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1703; Rock & Wachter, 
supra note 9, at 1609; id. at 1613. 
 190. See, e.g., Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1717; Jones, supra note 15, at 
121-24; Kahan, supra note 5, at 1870; Rock & Wachter, supra note 60, at 434; Rock & 
Wachter, supra note 5, at 1621.  To give an example: Lawrence Mitchell has developed 
a “trust model” of the firm, which centers around the breach of implicit ‘contracts’ by 
corporate directors.  Such ‘contracts’ embody the good faith expectations of various 
firm constituencies.  See Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 871, 899.  See also 
Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 808 (mentioning “good faith expectations” 
which employees and other affected communities “were told to trust”). 
 191. ARROW, supra note 28, at 23; Dent, supra note 10, at 1221; Hart, Norms and 
Theory, supra note 38, at 1702; Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870; Rock 
& Wachter, supra note 9, at 1609.  With regard to the norm of “trust,” Lawrence Mit-
chell describes the corporate law dilemma that is the topic of this Article well when he 
states: “To trust is, in my own field of corporate law, to be willing to invest your money 
in a corporation managed by people you have never seen, you have never met, about 
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• (good) faith193 and faithfulness;194
• loyalty;
 
195
• fairness;
 
196
• guardianship
 
197 and duty;198
• sense of honor;
 
199
• sense of obligation
 
200 and responsibility;201
• honesty (truthfulness)
 
202 and integrity;203
• confidence;
 
204
• (moral) character
 
205 and decency;206
 
whom you know very little, and some of whose names you may not know at all.”  See 
Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 599.  See also Stout, Investor Confidence, supra 
note 51, at 407-08. 
 
 192. Alces, supra note 42, at 241; Chapman, supra note 183, at 583; Hart, Norms 
and Theory, supra note 38, at 1714; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597; Stout, In-
vestor Confidence, supra note 51, at 416; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. 
 193. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 871, 899; Stout, Investor Confi-
dence, supra note 51, at 411; Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 808. 
 194. Cf. Johnson, supra note 63, at 5, 25-28; Meurer, supra note 53, at 740; Stout, 
Mythical Benefits, supra note 57, at 797. 
 195. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870. See also Gambetta, supra note 
85, at 218 n.9 (“Loyalty, in this context, can perhaps be seen as the maintenance of 
global trust – in a person, a party, an institution – even in circumstances where local 
disappointments might encourage its withdrawal.”) (emphasis in original). 
 196. Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trustworthiness, 81 B.U. L. 
REV. 523, 529 (2001); Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1703; Meurer, supra 
note 53, at 744 (“fair dealing”); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Fairness and Trust in Corporate 
Law, 43 DUKE L.J. 425, 425-26 (1993) [hereinafter Mitchell, Fairness]; Stout, Investor 
Confidence, supra note 51, at 424. 
 197. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 550-51 n.21 (“Platonic guardians”); 
Cox & Munsinger, supra note 66, at 84 (“faithful guardians”). 
 198. Bainbridge, Primacy, supra note 12, at 550-51 n.21; Kahan, supra note 5, at 
1870; Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870. 
 199. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 8. 
 200. Kahan, supra note 5, at 1872; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. 
 201. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 18. 
 202. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 529 (“truth-telling”); Cooter & Ei-
senberg, supra note 61, at 1723 (2001); Grossman, supra note 53, at 466; Hart, Norms 
and Theory, supra note 38, at 1702. 
 203. Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 3, at 306; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, 
supra note 3, at 767; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. 
 204. Alces, supra note 42, at 241; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3, at 769. 
 205. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 528; Chapman, supra note 183, at 
582; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1726; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 
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• reputation,207 prestige208 and credibility;209
• corporate culture;
 
210
• generosity
 
211 and altruism;212
• affinity
 and 
213 and empathy.214
These protolegal values and attributes form the very core of direc-
torial legal (if only, aspirational)
 
215 mandates imposed by American cor-
porate law.216
 
599; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 425; Stout, Proper Motives, supra 
note 12, at 20. 
  I argue that a fully developed understanding of their re-
 206. Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1703; Lee, supra note 10, at 572. 
 207. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 527-28; Dooley, supra note 6, at 525; 
Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1721; Hart, An Economist’s View, supra note 3, 
at 306; Hart, Norms and Theory, supra note 38, at 1714; Meurer, supra note 53, at 742-
45; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1613; Smith, supra note 50, at 969; Stout, Proper 
Motives, supra note 12, at 7. 
 208. Cox & Munsinger, supra note 66, at 94; Elhauge, supra note 35, at 752. 
 209. Chapman, supra note 183; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1611. 
 210. Meurer, supra note 53, at 745; Ripken, supra note 33, at 133-38; Rock & 
Wachter, supra note 5, at 1642; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608.  Other syn-
onyms may be used for this “norm” including “being, core, . . . ethos, identity, ideology, 
manner, patterns, philosophy, purpose, roots, spirit, style, vision, and way.”  STANLEY 
M. DAVIS, MANAGING CORPORATE CULTURE 1 n.1 (1984). 
 211. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723. 
 212. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 529; Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, 
supra note 5, at 1809-10 (“concern for others”); George W. Dent, Jr., Race, Trust, Al-
truism and Reciprocity, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1001, 1001 (2005) [hereinafter Dent, 
Race]; Jones, supra note 15, at 125; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 1, 12. 
 213. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 608, 615 (describing how the importance of 
being able to trust a partner in a fiduciary relationship, and the importance of being 
trustworthy, can rise to the level of the intimacy of marriage itself). 
 214. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 608. 
 215. Bainbridge, Abstention Doctrine, supra note 6, at 89 n.37; Garza, supra note 
14, at 629; Ibrahim, supra note 6, at 934; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 613-14; 
Rock, supra note 14, at 1015; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 1608.  See also Rock & 
Wachter, Corporate Law as a Facilitator, supra note 14, at 529. (“[O]ne should think 
of fiduciary duty cases as judicial sermons that exhort managers to consummate per-
formance and that criticize those who perform below expectations, even if, or perhaps 
especially when, no direct legal sanction is imposed.”) (footnote omitted). 
 216. Cf. Alces, supra note 42, at 241 (“Beneficiaries want to rely on someone else’s 
expertise and think it is in their best interests to trust, rather than directly control, the 
fiduciary.  This focus on trust rather than direct monitoring or control is the hallmark of 
fiduciary law.”); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597; id. at 614 (“Fiduciary duty is, 
famously, about trust.”); Rock, supra note 14, at 1097 (“[F]iduciary duty law evolves 
primarily at the level of norms rather than the level of rules.”).  See also Luhmann,  
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spective operation in the black box of corporate governance constitutes a 
first step in the process of unveiling the truly controlling variables be-
hind observable, standardized and compliant director behavior, on the 
one hand, and absolute director primacy in a world without effective le-
gal means for director accountability, on the other hand. 
 
V. THE MACROTHEORETICAL DILEMMA:  
NORM ACTUATION UNEXPLAINED 
Each macrotheoretical model that reverts—by definition—to some 
of the above normative concerns (and, thus, allows directorial self-
expectations and moral standards to enter the modeling equation) must 
explain how these protolegal foundations of interpersonal relationships 
and cooperation, in the reality of corporate governance, become actuated 
in directorial decisionmaking behavior.  Such explanation of norm act-
uation also must unveil the forces and devices employed in order to (i) 
deploy norms and foster norm perception with general latency and 
command (i.e., “this is—under any and all circumstances—the generally 
expected and accepted behavior of a corporate director”)217 and (ii) ac-
tuate norms with precise specificity and command (i.e., “this is the 
‘proper,’ hence acceptable and expected, directorial behavior under 
these particularized circumstances”).  Those forces and devices, fur-
thermore, must be extremely powerful,218 as well as extremely efficient, 
in order to sufficiently discipline and standardize individualistic (if not, 
opportunistic) directorial behavior naturally faced with a limitless spec-
trum219
 
Familiarity, supra note 51, at 94 (discussing Bernhard Barber’s differentiation of “three 
dimensions in which trusting expectations may fail” and including therein as one di-
mension “the fiduciary obligations of actors, that is, their duty and their motives to 
place the interests of others before their own;” BERNHARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND 
LIMITS OF TRUST (1983)). 
 of decisional opportunities and options.  How else to guarantee 
both the vast repetition of “proper” directorial behavior and the limited 
instances and variety of “improper” directorial behavior (i.e., misbeha-
 217. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1798.  Norm actuation 
seems to occur with vast amounts of standardized normative repetition and relatively 
marginal instances of normative deviation from the standard, both within individual di-
rectors and among the whole spectrum of corporate boards. 
 218. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 602. 
 219. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 190. 
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vior) that we seem to be able to observe within the marketplaces of cor-
porate reality? 
Two realms exist in which norm actuation may happen.220  The first 
realm is based on technique and perception (i.e., norm actuation is “cog-
nitive-based”), while the second realm is based on internalization and 
authenticity (i.e., norm actuation is “affect-based”).221  With regard to 
the former, corporate directors may have a fairly standardized perception 
of what is expected of them and how they need to behave to meet such 
external expectations and, accordingly, to make themselves look good 
(both before others and before themselves).222  The actuation of norma-
tive concerns within directorial decisionmaking may therefore be merely 
intuitive, unconscious and reflexive (i.e., not much, if any, thought is 
given to what the “right” behavior should be, because it naturally “feels” 
to fall in line with standard and generally accepted behavior of directors 
and, thus, feels appropriate223).224
 
 220. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1722. 
  Alternatively, norm actuation as part 
 221. See, e.g., the distinction usually made in organizational psychology between 
cognitive-based trust (which is based on the knowledge and recognition of the fidu-
ciary’s reliability, dependability, and competence) and affect-based trust (which de-
pends on the investment and reciprocation of the fiduciary’s genuine care and concern 
for the welfare of others); see Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 361-62; Daniel J. McAl-
lister, Affect- and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation 
in Organizations, 38 ACAD. OF MGMT J. 24, 25-26 (1995); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 
13, at 608. 
 222. This cognitive process is usually described as “self-verification.”  See Burke & 
Stets, supra note 26, at 347.  See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 66, at 94 
(“Through attachment to a group, especially one of high prestige, individuals satisfy 
their needs to validate their self-worth, particularly by the group’s feedback.”).  Warren 
Buffet once described this cognitive process as “elephant bumping” (Warren E. Buffet, 
et al., Hostile Takeovers and Junk Bond Financing: A Panel Discussion, in JOHN C. 
COFFEE ET AL., KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE 
TAKEOVER 10, 14 (1988) (“I mean [corporate leaders] like to go to the places where 
other elephants are, because it reaffirms the fact that when they look around the room 
and they see all these other elephants that they must be an elephant too, or why would 
they be there?”). 
 223. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1798. 
 224. Such reflexive adherence—i.e., directors intuitively and unquestioningly be-
lieve in a particular norm—might, for example, explain the prevalence of shareholder 
value constructs in the corporate governance debate.  In other words, shareholder value 
is believed to be a norm in itself that reflexively and self-referentially replicates itself.  
Cf. Kaushik Basu, Social Norms and the Law, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW, 476, 477 (2002) (describing how certain norms stop us 
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of directorial behavior may be deliberate, calculative and instrumental 
(i.e., behavior is purposefully structured to signal225 to others that a par-
ticular normative agenda is at play and controlling the decisionmaking—
whether that is indeed the case or not).226  In the latter variant, where the 
normative directorial footprint becomes part of the firm’s social capi-
tal,227 it would be possible, at least in theory, to employ techniques to 
develop a regime of firm-specific norms (for example, norms of a firm 
that require fair conduct by its agents)228
Furthermore, with regard to external motivational forces behind di-
rectorial behavior, it is possible to link this first realm of norm actuation 
with the remedial side of ex-post social sanctions (as opposed to non-
existent legal sanctions), such as guilt, disapprobation and other shaming 
exercises
 that can then be signaled to 
markets in order to build (additional) social capital in the form of reputa-
tional net gains. 
229 that, in the case of noncompliance with norms, would lead 
to reputational net losses230 and, in the case of normative compliance, 
would lead to net gains in reputation (i.e., to being perceived as a good 
moral actor and conscientious corporate director).231
 
“from doing certain things or choosing certain options, irrespective of how much utility 
that thing or option gives us”); Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1723; Elhauge, 
supra note 35, at 752. 
  Fear of shaming 
 225. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 216 (“The problem, therefore, is essentially one 
of communication: even if people have perfectly adequate motives for cooperation they 
still need to know about each other’s motives and to trust each other, or at least the ef-
fectiveness of their motives.  It is necessary not only to trust others before acting coope-
ratively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others.”) (emphasis in original). 
 226. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 177, at 2152; Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, 
at 1722; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597.  See also Lee, supra note 10, at 572 
(“People act morally because their utility responds to ‘social and moral sanctions.’”). 
 227. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 596-97; Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 
81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 567-68 (2001) [hereinafter Ribstein, Law v. Trust]. 
 228. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1719. 
 229. See, e.g., Elhauge, supra note 35, at 752; Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 
227, at 564; Rock, supra note 14, at 1104; David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate 
Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1814-15 (2001). 
 230. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 60, at 430. 
 231. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 15, at 108; Meurer, supra note 53, at 744 (“Reputa-
tion works in the larger commercial community to promote efficient performance.”); 
Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 7. With regard to the norm of “trust,” Law-
rence Mitchell has described this process well when he defines “trust” as follows: “To 
be trusted is to be held accountable for the trust reposed by the truster, to be held to a 
standard of behavior that allows these very important relationships to form and be sus-
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and the personal non-comfort or pain of feeling guilty will make direc-
tors stay the line of “proper” decisional behavior (at least, in an over-
whelming majority of cases) by internally monitoring—either reflexive-
ly or calculatively—their external perception.232
The second realm of norm actuation is more difficult to describe 
because it abstracts entirely from common neoclassical approaches to 
managerial behavior—namely calculated “carrots” (i.e., external re-
wards) or calculated “sticks” (i.e., external sanctions).
 
233  This realm is 
not about external incentives or pressures influencing directorial deci-
sionmaking.234  It is about neither sticks nor carrots, but about internal 
pressures that may be prevalent in a given director’s moral psycholo-
gy235 and, thus, may influence (if not, overwrite) any opportunistic be-
havioral tendencies of such director.  The argument goes like this: from 
the perspective of an investor, “a fair degree of reliance”236 on the 
soundness, fairness and diligence of directorial behavior ex-ante (in or-
der to allow for firm-specific investments to be made with confidence) 
may be—and, maybe, even should be—the result of “correct” ex-ante 
directorial internalizations of moral imperatives.237
 
tained, and to be held responsible by social approbation, feelings of failure and guilt, 
and sometimes by law if that trust reposed is breached.  Perhaps most importantly, to be 
trusted is to be told that we are trustworthy.  And to be told that we are trustworthy de-
mands that we behave at a level that reflects that gift.”  See Mitchell, Trusted, supra 
note 13, at 599. 
  In other words, di-
rectors act (or, at least, attempt to act) with authenticity and as genuine 
moral actors, thereby avoiding all moral hazards that would otherwise 
allow them to shirk on their performance, since they would not be run-
 232. Cf. Kahan, supra note 5, at 1870; Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Develop-
ment, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997); Mitchell, Trusted, 
supra note 13, at 616.  See also Lee, supra note 10, at 572 (“In other words, in addition 
to the utility they derive from the satisfaction of their own interests, individuals derive 
positive utility from praise and feelings of virtue and they experience disutility from 
criticism and feelings of guilt.”) (footnote omitted). 
 233. Cf. Grossman, supra note 53, at 466; Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, 
at 425; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 4. 
 234. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 8. 
 235. See Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 602. 
 236. ARROW, supra note 28, at 23. 
 237. See Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1794; Melvin A. Eisen-
berg, Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1258-61 (1999); 
Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 597; id. 602; Rock, supra note 14, at 1013; Stout, 
Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 18. 
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ning any risk of legal repercussions or social sanctions.  They do this 
simply by way of internalized, normative reactions.  Corporate directors 
are (pre-)conditioned to behave well.238  To conveniently avoid any need 
for applicable legal constraints, all we need to do is detect and select 
(and know how to detect and select) the good moral agents who will 
have such internalized, normative reactions.239  Therefore, this second 
realm of norm actuation is less dependent on ex-post external sanctions 
(social or legal).  Rather, it emphasizes ex-ante internalized social beha-
vior in corporate directors (which may, or may not, lead to internal re-
wards, such as simply feeling good about how one has acted in a particu-
lar situation and feeling in sync with one’s personal moral compass and 
own conscience).240
How and when such ex-ante internalization within the second realm 
of norm actuation comes about, however, is extremely difficult to ascer-
tain.
 
241  For example, we need to explain how the substance of such 
norm internalization is achieved in order to coincide and significantly 
overlap with (apparently) some sort of majoritarian default of moral 
“rightness” in corporate reality.  Furthermore, we need to understand 
how such majoritarian default is sufficiently and effectively signaled to 
the different marketplaces of firm investors to entice such investors to 
make (often sunk) firm-specific investments with confidence.242
 
 238. Cf. Chapman, supra note 183, at 585 (“But the incumbent managers in the 
Shleifer and Summers argument are not loyal or trustworthy for instrumental reasons at 
all.  The simply are loyal in virtue of the actual lives they have lived, and the promises 
they have made.”) (emphasis in original) (discussing Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence 
Summers, Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES 
AND CONSEQUENCES 33 (A. Auerbach ed., 1988)); Grossman, supra note 53, at 466 
(“Perhaps a better approach is to make directors want to do the right thing.”) (emphasis 
in original); Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 553-54 (“Trusting people coope-
rate because it is in their nature or because they have been socialized to do it, not be-
cause some costly structure has been set up to ensure reliability.”). 
  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, we need to find out how such internalized 
 239. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 612. 
 240. Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 347; Elhauge, supra note 35, at 752 (“plea-
surable feelings of virtue, inner peace, or satisfaction”). 
 241. Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1728. 
 242. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 216 (“The problem, therefore, is essentially one of 
communication: even if people have perfectly adequate motives for cooperation they 
still need to know about each other’s motives and to trust each other, or at least the ef-
fectiveness of their motives.  It is necessary not only to trust others before acting coope-
ratively, but also to believe that one is trusted by others.”) (emphasis in original). 
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normative majoritarian agenda is exercised consistently over an infinite 
continuum of different individual directors, corporate boards, decisional 
substances, cultural contexts, and points in time.243  Only such consistent 
and continuous exercise (longa consuetudo) allows any normative majo-
ritarian agenda to sufficiently and efficiently affect absolute directorial 
decisionmaking power so that the vast majority of board decisions made 
(i.e., the output determinations in the decisional black box described 
above) are, at a minimum, perceived as “correct,” “fair” or, at least, “to-
lerable enough” so that firm participants remain involved and invested 
on a going-forward basis.  Here, we are eventually talking about (and are 
thinking about ways to pre-evaluate) “good agent character” and how 
firms select for good agent character and have efficient insight into good 
moral character in the first place to select good agents.  This, to date, is 
at best a mostly unexplained and rather mysterious process.244
A Taoist
 
245 or mysticism-based246
 
 243. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 190.  In this regard, the theory of “group-
think” developed in organizational psychology requires more of our attention.  Group-
think has been described as the dynamic process by which group members unconscious-
ly forgo their respective abilities to make realistic and internally validated individual 
adaptive decisions for the sake of conformity with, and commitment to, a group mode 
of thinking and deciding which will then often morph—for purposes of group cohesion 
and collective orientation—into a group esprit de corps and rapport and into what has 
been described as “homosocial reproduction.”  See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOS (1982); ROSABETH MOSS 
KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 48, 63 (1977) (coining the term “ho-
mosocial reproduction”); Marlene A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of 
Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 1233 (2003).  See also Cox & Munsinger, supra note 
66, at 92-95; Jones, supra note 15, at 139-41; Steven A. Ramirez, The End of Corporate 
Governance Law: Optimizing Regulatory Structures for a Race to the Top, 24 YALE J. 
ON REG. 313, 340 (2007); Ripken, supra note 33, at 132-33. 
 approach to the accountability 
 244. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 3, 8. 
 245. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 606. 
 246. GILBERT K. CHESTERTON, ORTHODOXY 48 (1908) (“Mysticism keeps men sane.  
As long as you have mystery you have health; when you destroy mystery you create 
morbidity.  The ordinary man has always been sane because the ordinary man has al-
ways been a mystic.  He has permitted the twilight.  He has always had one foot in earth 
and the other in fairyland.  He has always left himself free to doubt his gods; but (unlike 
the agnostic of to-day) free also to believe in them.  He has always cared more for truth 
than for consistency.  If he saw two truths that seemed to contradict each other, he 
would take the two truths and the contradiction along with them.”).  See also ANTOINE 
DE SAINT-EXUPÉRY, THE LITTLE PRINCE 63 (Richard Howard trans., Harcourt 2000) 
(1943) (“One sees clearly only with the heart.  Anything essential is invisible to the 
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conundrum of directorial behavior would probably claim that such 
process will always remain unexplained and, thus, mysterious.  Howev-
er, I believe that something more can be done, at least, in principle.  Let 
us take as an example the protolegal variable that arguably constitutes 
the very heart of the fiduciary relationship between corporate directors 
and the corporation as an aggregation of factors of production: trust. 
Decisional discretion by some over recognized interests of others 
requires trust.247  Much has been written about trust, the central “extra-
legal”248 norm of directorial behavior.  For example, Lawrence Mitchell, 
one of the leading legal scholars on trust and trustworthiness in the 
realm of corporate law,249 has developed a trust model of the firm that is 
built on the breach of implicit contracts that embody the good faith ex-
pectations of the various firm constituencies.250  Moreover, Oliver Wil-
liamson, in his leading economic model of trust,251 has famously stated 
that “calculative trust is a contradiction in terms”252 since both terms—
calculativeness and trust—are not only deemed mutually exclusive con-
cepts (at least, on first blush), but “trust,” as a diffuse, mixed-meaning 
and, thus, confusing term, is useless to explain economic transactions.253  
According to Williamson, the concept of calculativeness (i.e., economic 
actors eliminate the need for trust by calculatively anticipating and allo-
cating risk ex-ante) can instead explain the behavior of economic ac-
tors.254
 
eyes.”). 
  For Mitchell, extralegal norms like trust are part and parcel of all 
human relations (including those of economic, rational-choice actors), 
 247. Cf. Epstein, supra note 85, at 9; Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196, at 430; 
Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 188. 
 248. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 615. 
 249. See Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196; Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and the 
Overlapping Consensus, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1918 (1994) [hereinafter Mitchell, Over-
lapping Consensus]; Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23; Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra 
note 50, at 870; Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13. 
 250. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 871, 899.  See also Mitchell, Fair-
ness, supra note 196; Mitchell, Overlapping Consensus, supra note 249; Mitchell, 
Trust, supra note 23; Mitchell, Norms, supra note 149; Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 
13. Cf. Wallman, Understanding, supra note 10, at 808 (mentioning “good faith expec-
tations” which employees and other affected communities “were told to trust”). 
 251. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 603. 
 252. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463. 
 253. Id. at 469.  See also Epstein, supra note 85, at 10; Posner, supra note 170, at 
1699. 
 254. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463. 
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and those relations are “arranged along a spectrum of affinity” so that 
there is “a thread of human empathy even in the most calculating rela-
tionships.”255
To be trusted is to be held accountable for the trust reposed by the 
truster, to be held to a standard of behavior that allows these very 
important relationships to form and be sustained, and to be held re-
sponsible by social approbation, feelings of failure and guilt, and 
sometimes by law if that trust reposed is breached.  Perhaps most 
importantly, to be trusted is to be told that we are trustworthy.  And 
to be told that we are trustworthy demands that we behave at a level 
that reflects that gift.
  As such: 
256
In other words, trust is a reciprocal arrangement that mutually bene-
fits both sides of the equation (i.e., the exercise results in net gains of 
social/reputational capital for both parties).
 
257  However, the truster and 
the trustee must signal to each other their trustworthiness and willing-
ness to actually trust, and then go through with the arrangement and play 
their designated roles in a well-behaved manner.258  However, I am un-
certain whether the expectational259 demand made by a trusting person, 
merely based on the fact that I am simply perceived and told to be trust-
worthy (I might not be or might not want to be), is indeed a “gift” or 
whether it is rather a curse.  For starters, I do not like to be told things.  
In particular, I do not like to be told what I am or am not, or more pre-
cisely, what I should be or should not be.  I do not know—as a human 
being striving for my personal authenticity and autonomy free from any 
“trappings” of external validation—whether I even want to be trusted; 
whether I want to be held responsible (whatever that means in this con-
text) by “social approbation” and “feelings of failure and guilt.”  Why 
should I care?  Why should I let my moral compass and personal con-
science be manipulated260
 
 255. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 608. 
 in that way?  I neither like to be shamed nor 
 256. Id. at 599. 
 257. Cf. Coffee, supra note 177, at 2151; Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1002. 
 258. Cf. Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1717, 1724 (2006) (“[T]rust requires more than simple cooperation.  It re-
quires, in addition, a sense of entitlement to return beneficience.”) (footnote omitted). 
 259. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 217 (describing trust as “a particular expecta-
tion we have with regard to the likely behaviour of others”). 
 260. Cf. Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 437 (“Experienced policy-
makers and businesspeople (and certainly experienced con artists) have long known that 
2011] DECONSTRUCTING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: 517 
DIRECTOR PRIMACY WITHOUT PRINCIPLE? 
 
framed.261
In other words, I believe that, in contrast to the Williamsonian 
worldview in which “[c]alculative trust is a contradiction in terms,”
 
262 
calculative trust is rather a generally misunderstood tautology.263  Trust 
and trustworthiness are always calculative.264  They are designed to deal 
with the eternally present Knightian265 uncertainty of future outcomes.266
 
trust is a potent force in explaining and manipulating investor behavior.”) (emphasis 
added). 
  
 261. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796 (“In other words, fi-
duciary duty law works through framing, not shaming.”) (emphasis in original).  See 
also Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 566.  In this regard, framing is a similar 
organizational pressure aimed at invading and affecting individual preferences and be-
havior as is shaming.  Thus, ultimately, it is a manipulative mechanism aimed at wea-
kening (and dumbing down) the collective cognitive functioning of groups by enhanc-
ing the unconscious adherence to group norms and assumptions.  Cf. Ramirez, supra 
note 243, at 340; Ripken, supra note 33, at 133-38. 
 262. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463. 
 263. Cf. Stigler, supra note 171, at 442 (“21. The central argument is not only a tau-
tology, it is false.”). 
 264. I believe that Lawrence Mitchell reveals as much himself when he says that 
“[i]n the absence of trustworthiness, trusting not only would be irrational in a technical 
sense—it would be plain stupid.” See Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 599.  See also 
Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191 (“Trust derives centrally from our confidence in 
the trusted’s intentions, specifically, that the trusted will act in the manner we expect 
her to.”). In other words, trusting will only be extended ‘rationally’ if and once the trus-
ter, before trusting, has gone through an affirmatively satisfactory, calculative evalua-
tion of whether there is enough ex ante trustworthiness in the person to be trusted.  Oth-
erwise, if I trust without this calculative, evaluative basis for trusting, I am acting 
irrationally.  See also Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 479 (explaining 
how calculative behavior needs to be suppressed in order to preserve the quality of the 
trust relationship and how the decision to suppress calculativeness may itself be calcula-
tive, thereby making it impossible to ever achieve pure non-calculative trust).  Thus, my 
view is the opposite of the Williamsonian approach in that I believe that not calculative 
trust but that non-calculative trust is a contradiction in terms. 
 265. KNIGHT, supra note 3, at 109, 235, 223. 
 266. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 218 (“The condition of ignorance or uncertain-
ty about other people’s behaviour is central to the notion of trust.”); McAllister, supra 
note 221, at 25 (“Trust enables people to take risks[.]”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, 
at 191 (stating that “a major function of trust is to help us to reduce the uncertainty and 
complexity of society”).  Uncertainty, of course, exists because of the lack of know-
ledge of what the future will bring, i.e. because of the lack of knowledge of all stochas-
tic variables.  See, e.g., Alces, supra note 42, at 241-42; Bainbridge, Primacy, supra 
note 12, at 556 n.44; Meurer, supra note 53, at 739; Richter, supra note 5, at 175 n.22.  
See also Dooley, supra note 6, at 465 (“If there were no bounded rationality, including 
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They control behavior of others to produce preferential outcomes that, 
ex-ante, one cannot control (entirely) by oneself.267  They are self-
referential, autopoietic expectation exercises that always work both 
ways and lock both parties into a cohesive,268 dyadic,269 and requiting 
dance.270  Why do we do this?  Because it, apparently, is too hard for us 
human beings in post-capitalist271 industrial societies to each be (or to, at 
least, try to be as much as humanly possible) individually autonomous, 
authentic and true to ourselves.272
 
no limitations on human foresight or the ability to acquire and process information, in-
dividuals could write completely specified contingent contracts.”); Gambetta, supra 
note 85, at 218 (“If we were blessed with an unlimited computational ability to map out 
all possible contingencies in enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem.”) (ref-
erence omitted). 
 
 267. See Gambetta, supra note 85, at 217 (“[T]rust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a 
particular level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another 
agent or group of agents will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor 
such action (or independently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a con-
text in which it affects his own action.”) (emphases in original) (references omitted). 
 268. Cf. Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 347 (“We suggest that the processes of es-
tablishing and maintaining self-verification contexts, and the positive self-feelings that 
result, lead to the development of interpersonal or group cohesiveness in the form of 
commitment, emotional attachment, and a collective orientation.”). 
 269. Id., at 348 (“Self-verification leads to positive self-evaluations and positive 
other-evaluations in the form of dyadic trust, and trust facilitates attachment to the oth-
er.  This attachment should reveal itself not only in commitment to the other but also in 
positive feelings for the other and, we anticipate, in a collective orientation to the rela-
tionship.”). 
 270. What I mean by this is that each truster is not only trusting but—
simultaneously—signaling that she is trustworthy of being good at trusting.  Likewise, 
each trustee is not only signaling that he is trustworthy but—at the same time—also 
trusting that the truster will reciprocate and appreciate the trustworthiness made availa-
ble to her.  Each party deals with a complete set of expectations, counter-expectations 
and expectation-expectations.  Cf. id., at 348; Hill & O’Hara, supra note 258, at 1724; 
McAllister, supra note 221, at 25. 
 271. Cf. Mitchell, Trust and Team, supra note 50, at 870. 
 272. Cf. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 555 (“[Trust] refers to the wil-
lingness to make oneself vulnerable to another without costly external constraints.”) 
(emphasis added); Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 415-16 (arguing that 
“rational expectation investors,” i.e., those investors who do not trust but act and invest 
on a purely calculative basis, “protect themselves from exploitation by refusing to be-
come vulnerable in the first place”) (emphasis added).  In general, I argue, that we do 
not appreciate our respective individual (but only perceived) vulnerabilities.  There is 
no larger perceived vulnerability than our respective individual (and very real) mortali-
ty.  Thus, trusting is merely an exercise in shadow-boxing—in dealing with the shadows 
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In my worldview, trust is double-blind calculativeness.273  It is as 
calculated as rational choice but, perhaps, only feels more dignified and 
virtuous since it avoids the paradigm of a cold-blooded, hard-driven 
bargain.274
Accordingly, trust is just a bargain, albeit on a higher-order level of 
  However, when it is coupled with control exercises about fu-
ture behavior of other human beings—in particular, when the control 
exercises are driven by such powerful corporate incentives as wealth 
maximization and control—then trust is calculative from its core to its 
very periphery. 
 
of our perceptions of external costs rather than dealing with the internal, and entirely 
genuine wealth of our own existence.  Accordingly, trust is always futile.  It creates 
more distance from, rather than brings us closer to, our respective personal reality and 
truth. 
 273. Cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 480-81 (explaining that “the 
calculative approach can be taken to extremes” and that, for purposes of maintaining its 
functionality, calculative behavior sometimes needs to occur subconsciously and needs 
to be suppressed in order to preserve the quality of the trust relationship).  See also Blair 
& Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1797 (“[T]rying to shore up trust behavior by 
making it easier for corporate participants to ‘litigate trust’ may produce the counterin-
tuitive result of an increase in the incidence of the untrustworthy behavior.”); id. at 
1808-09; Gambetta, supra note 85, at 213-14 (“The unqualified claim that more coop-
eration than we normally get would be desirable . . . , if preached too extensively, may 
even have the effect of making cooperation less attractive.”) (footnote and reference 
omitted); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 258, at 1793 (“We think that the window of actual 
liability for breaches of the duty of care should remain small.  A larger window might 
encourage costly and inefficient levels of residual distrust, where directors are overly 
motivated to ‘look for everything’ and officers, feeling distrusted, are more apt to be-
have in an untrustworthy manner.”) (footnote omitted); Jones, supra note 15, at 109 
(“[T]he prospect of disproportionate penalties hinder the internalization of appropriate 
moral values by corporate leaders.”); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 831 (“When the law 
becomes too aggressive, it risks altering the social dynamic of the board in a way that 
makes it less effective as a working group.”); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 606 
(“It is almost as if, in a Tao-like way, Williamson believes that naming the reality de-
stroys the relationship.”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 18 (“The empirical 
evidence suggests that if we place too heavy a burden on [altruistic notions as, for ex-
ample, the directors’ internalized sense of responsibility], they will crumble under the 
weight.”). 
 274. Cf. Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 600; Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 
227, at 563 (“Family members or close friends may eschew calculation of probabilities 
as inconsistent with the intimate bond between them.”); Williamson, Calculativeness, 
supra note 85, at 486 (stating that personal, i.e., nearly noncalculative, trust “is war-
ranted only for very special personal relations that would be seriously degraded if a cal-
culative orientation were ‘permitted’”). 
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abstraction (and, thus, obscuration and obfuscation).275  Actors that en-
gage in signaling trust and trustworthiness want something from each 
other.  If I want something from another human being—as an indepen-
dent, autonomous actor whose actions and inactions I do not control—I 
will engage in a calculative exercise to find out about and achieve two 
ends: (i) how to get it and (ii) what to give for it.  Not “getting” or not 
“giving” is no longer part of the calculative equation.276  Although trust 
matters,277 trust only matters because it pays.278
 
 275. Cf. Luhmann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 98 (“Moreover, trust is only possi-
ble in a situation where the possible damage may be greater than the advantage you 
seek. Otherwise, it would simply be a question of rational calculation and you would 
choose your action anyway, because the risks remain within acceptable limits. Trust is 
only required if a bad outcome would make you regret your action.”) (reference omit-
ted).  Cf. also Lee, supra note 10, at 537. 
 
 276. Cf. ARROW, supra note 28, at 23 (“Trust is … extremely efficient; it saves a lot 
of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word.  Unfortunately this is 
not a commodity which can be bought very easily.  If you have to buy it, you already 
have some doubts about what you’ve bought.”).  My point is that we should extend this 
Arrowian insight to the very basis of trust.  Trust is ‘bought’ or ‘contracted’ for.  Trust 
constitutes an implicit, gap-filling, self-enforcing ‘contract’ because to provide for de-
tails ex ante by complete contracting is just “too damn hard.”  Trust is a commodity, 
only on perhaps a higher plain of complexity, and we should have doubts about what it 
is that we are buying and for what ends we are willing to engage in these forms of sub-
tle manipulations of others and selves.  See also Williamson, Calculativeness, supra 
note 85, at 486 n.136 (“When trust is justified by expectations of positive reciprocal 
consequences, it is simply another version of economic exchange.”) (quoting JAMES 
MARCH & JOHAN OLSEN, REDISCOVERING INSTITUTIONS 27 (1989)). 
 277. Cf. Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 196, at 523 (“The need to decide whether 
to trust another party is ubiquitous in business dealings.”); Chapman, supra note 183, at 
549 (“Trust plays an essential role in all modern economies, and without it, or without 
the coordination that is provided by institutional loyalty, even efficient wealth-
maximizing corporate contracting can make us all worse off.”); Coffee, supra note 177, 
at 2175; Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1001-02; Hill & O’Hara, supra note 258, at 
1723 (“Trust is an essential component of human relationships and a fundamental build-
ing block of healthy societies.”); Mitchell, Fairness, supra note 196, at 425 (“Trust is 
the glue that binds corporate relationships.”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 185 
(“Trust is one of the most important institutions binding our society.”); Stout, Investor 
Confidence, supra note 51, at 408 (“Investor trust provides the foundation on which the 
American securities market has been built.  Without investor trust, our market would be 
a thin shadow of its present self.”). 
 278. “The service and the loyalty I owe, In doing it, pays itself.” WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH act 1 sc. 4.  See supra note 187 and accompanying text.  See 
also Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 553 (“Trust is a kind of social glue that 
allows people to interact at low transactions costs.”) (footnote omitted). 
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Trust is only about using each other to maximize one’s own indi-
vidual utility.279  Trust pays280 because—as a calculative, mutually reci-
procated, self-enforcing and, thus, autopoietic means designed to deal 
with uncertainty once complete contracting becomes impossible or, at 
least, impracticable281—it allows trust parties to achieve their respective 
individual, egocentric ends.  When trust works well, those individual 
ends turn out to be fully complementary.  At the same time, a successful 
trust arrangement reinforces the calculative exercise of trusting as both 
individually and mutually beneficial.282  Given such reality of trust rela-
tionships, it is not “calculative trust,” but its opposite, noncalculative 
trust, that is truly oxymoronic, i.e., “a contradiction in terms.”283
Thus, trust is not a norm, but rather a calculative, manipulative
 
284
 
 279. Cf. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 560. 
 
device of controlling the behavior of others (as well as of controlling the 
 280. And repays; see Cooter & Eisenberg, supra note 61, at 1728. 
 281. Cf. Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1003; Gambetta, supra note 85, at 218 (“If 
we were blessed with an unlimited computational ability to map out all possible contin-
gencies in enforceable contracts, trust would not be a problem.”) (reference omitted); 
Richter, supra note 5, at 174-75 (“Under Knighian uncertainty, it is impossible to write 
a complete contract that details all possible future contingencies, even if transaction 
costs are zero.”) (footnote omitted). 
 282. Burke & Stets, supra note 26, at 348 (“When another person verifies one’s self-
view, the process of trust is activated.  The self begins to see the other as predictable 
and dependable, and responds by developing trust in, and dependence on, the other.  If 
the other responds benevolently (is trustworthy), then commitment to the relationship is 
fostered.”) (reference omitted). 
 283. Cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 463; id. at 479 (explaining 
how the suppression of calculativeness itself may be calculative, thereby making it im-
possible to ever achieve pure non-calculative trust).  In other words, trust only exists 
conditionally.  It is always conditioned on at least some reciprocation (i.e., some mani-
pulated reaction) by the trustee to the trusting behavior of the truster.  Thus, ‘uncondi-
tional trust’ (cf. Luhmann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 94) is similarly oxymoronic or 
a contradiction in terms.  Compare Ribstein, Law v. Trust, supra note 227, at 556-57 
(“Like one who trusts, one who is trustworthy in the sense discussed in this article be-
haves non-calculatively, and honors his promise even in the absence of constraints such 
as repeat dealings.”) (footnote omitted).  See also Ben-Ner & Putterman, supra note 
196, at 525 (“[W]e suggest that the phenomenon of trusting in commerce is nonetheless 
substantially amenable to analysis in terms of self-interested calculation.”); Hill & 
O’Hara, supra note 258, at 1727 (“[I]t becomes in practice quite difficult to separate out 
calculative from noncalculative trust-relevant behavior.”). 
 284. See Stout, Investor Confidence, supra note 51, at 437 (“Experienced policy-
makers and businesspeople (and certainly experienced con artists) have long known that 
trust is a potent force in explaining and manipulating investor behavior.”). 
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requiting behavior of oneself measured in units of trustworthiness).  
Trust is a pure hedge to control for future outcomes in a world of uncer-
tainty285—for what is supposed to happen in order to make oneself indi-
vidually (and individually only) better off.  However, if trust is only a 
procedural device without normative substance other than in its mechan-
ical application,286 then it may be that most, if not all, of the other extra-
legal “norms” listed above are also mere calculative devices in order to 
predict, and manipulate, uncertain future behavior of (economic) actors, 
including oneself.  In this regard, those protolegal variables rather be-
come (or, more precisely, harbor hidden) protonormative variables.  
They are empty287
In summary, legal and economic scholarship has begun to describe 
and narrate the phenomenon of normative reactions of directorial deci-
sionmakers.  However, we are far from explaining such phenomenon per 
se (i.e., from normatively explaining why it happens, such that the ge-
nius of our American corporate law
 enforcers of an a priori normative substance that 
(re)creates itself through autopoiesis.  Without their embedded proto-
normative substance, the above “norms” are normatively vacuous. 
288 has stayed away from any enfor-
ceable ex-post legal accountability or any ex-ante legal constraints in or-
der to deter or punish directorial shirking).289
 
 285. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191. 
 
 286. Cf. Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1001-02 (“Trust in others is essential to hu-
man interaction, especially in dealings too complex for the parties’ rights and duties to 
be detailed in writing.”).  Thus, trust is a similar device to a ‘contract’ and comes with 
the identical functionality of a ‘contract’ and with nothing of normative value beyond 
such functionality. 
 287. In other words: prescriptively neutral. 
 288. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1, 151 (1993); 
McChesney, supra note 13, at 256.  See also Roberta Romano, Competition for State 
Corporate Law, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 
364-69 (2002).  Cf. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 3.  Even though the reference is to 
American corporate law, it is often claimed, as part of the so-called “convergence de-
bate,” that such genius of American corporate law is more and more universally ac-
cepted.  See, e.g., Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy, supra note 3, at 45; 
Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L. J. 439, 439, 468 (2001). 
 289. Cf. Gambetta, supra note 85, at 217 (“But ‘why should beliefs held by different 
individuals (or types of individual) be commonly known? The fact is that our under-
standing of human psychology … is hopelessly imperfect.  In particular, we have little 
idea of how individuals actually acquire beliefs’.  Among these beliefs, trust – a particu-
lar expectation we have with regard to the likely behaviour of others – is of fundamental 
importance.”) (quoting from Kenneth Binmore & Partha Dasgupta, Game Theory: A 
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VI. CLOSING SKETCHES:  
UNCOMMANDED COMMAND WITHOUT PRINCIPLE? 
This Article elaborated on a dilemma under the absolute director 
primacy model that I have developed290 and concludes that the dilemma 
is more complex and abstract than originally expected.  The dilemma is 
simply this: the board of directors in a Berle-Means corporation is not 
only autocratic, but it can also be totalitarian if, when and where it so 
pleases.291
No rational investor would participate in a firm knowing that its 
central decisionmaker can always act opportunistically (and, thus, shirk 
on performance at random) and, nonetheless, always get away with it.  
However, the empirically observable average of directorial behavior 
  Directors have complete discretion to make corporate deci-
sions by fiat and without any legal accountability for the substance of 
their decisions (as long as there is no implication of self-interest raising 
duty of loyalty concerns).  Directorial behavior based on unrestricted 
power is, therefore, by definition completely opportunistic. 
 
Survey, in ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION OF GAMES (Kenneth Binmore & Partha Dasgupta 
eds. 1986)); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 832 (“Until we discover exactly what direc-
tors hear amidst all the noise, we cannot begin to evaluate the wisdom of our bundle of 
legal and regulatory strategies touching on questions of boards of directors’ responsibil-
ities.”); Eric Talley, Disclosure Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1955, 2026 (2001) (“We are 
still, unfortunately, extremely far from formulating a general, predictive and falsifiable 
theory of norms.”); Williamson, supra note 147, at 596 (“[W]e are still very ignorant 
about institutions.”). 
 290. Reich-Graefe, supra note 10. 
 291. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1791 (“The net result is 
that, as a practical matter, a negligent director is more likely to be hit by lightning after 
leaving her board meeting than she is to pay damages.”); Jones, supra note 15, at 117 
(“Independent directors face an infinitesimal risk of paying personally for damages to 
the corporation cause bye their breach of fiduciary duty.”); Mitchell, Trust, supra note 
23, at 190 (stating that “directors have largely unlimited power over the corporation and 
its affairs”); Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 6 (“The business judgment rule . . 
. allows a director who makes even a minimal effort to become ‘informed’ to make 
foolhardy decisions all day long, without fear of liability.”); id. at 6-7 (“[I]t is only a 
slight exaggeration to suggest that a corporate director is statistically more likely to be 
attacked by killer bees than she is to have to ever pay damages for breach of the duty of 
care.”).  See also Alces, supra note 42, at 242 (“It is dangerous and costly to assume 
that fiduciary duties function well in the corporate context.  The assumption may give 
shareholders a false sense of security or a belief that they are able to discipline man-
agement effectively when in fact, because of the very limited nature of corporate gover-
nance duties, they are not.”). 
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suggests that corporate directors seem to get it reasonably right most of 
the time.  Firm-specific investments are made—daily and literally mil-
lions of times over292
I posit that a sound theoretical explanation of this phenomenon (and 
dilemma) is still missing from our current corporate governance debate.  
Neither current corporate law nor our microtheoretical models of the 
firm
—and with a good measure of predictive accuracy. 
293 do (or, logically, can) explain the daily phenomenon of general 
investor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of absent director ac-
countability ex-post-investment294—other than to assume ultimate con-
trol by some firm participant’s interests (for example, shareholder val-
ue), which is entirely illusory.295
 
 292. For example, the average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Ex-
change for NYSE-listed companies in 2009 totaled 7,982,926 trading transactions per 
diem, comprising an average of 2,179,775,581 shares traded for a total average consid-
eration of $46,670,638,331. Facts & Figures: Interactive Viewer, NYSEDATA.COM, 
http://www.nyxdata.com/nysedata/asp/factbook/viewer_edition.asp?mode=table&key=
3002&category=3).  See also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1737. 
  We really have no good idea yet about 
how corporate directors, faced with limitless opportunities (at least, in 
principle), will select from a complete set of nonreviewable substantive 
options that are available to them pursuant to their absolute, sui generis 
decisionmaking power granted by corporate law.  Neither do we have a 
good idea yet about how corporate directors are incentivized to repeated-
 293. The main four models in today’s academic discussion can be labeled as “share-
holder primacy,” “contractarian,” “team production” and “director primacy.” See, e.g., 
Bainbridge, Director v. Shareholder Primacy, supra note 3 (discussing shareholder-
primacy and director-primacy models); Coates, supra note 10 (discussing team-
production models); Dent, supra note 10 (discussing team-production and director-
primacy models); Fisch, supra note 10 (discussing shareholder-primacy models); Lee, 
supra note 10 (discussing shareholder primacy and team production models); Reich-
Graefe, supra note 10 (discussing all four models); Verret, supra note 10, at 315-26 
(discussing all four models as well as “agency theory” and “progressive corporate law 
theory”).  For a more general discussion of those firm models, see also Eisenberg, supra 
note 10; O’Kelley, The Entrepreneur, supra note 3; Wallman, Understanding, supra 
note 10. 
 294. Cf. Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191 (“Why would anybody invest money 
in a corporation, an institution over which she has no control?”); Stout, Proper Motives, 
supra note 12, at 3, 8 (asking why directors “seem to mostly live up to our trust”); id. at 
9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of tens of trillions of dollars of assets to 
purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-paper thin protection offered by the rules 
of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanctions.”). 
 295. Cf. Thomas Lee Hazen, The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Fail-
ure, and Moral Values, 69 N.C. L. REV. 273, 274 (1991). 
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ly select available options “properly” and “do the right thing.”296  Maybe 
Saint-Exupéry’s advice is indeed true and the essentials do remain “in-
visible to the eyes.”297
My attempt at an elaboration of the dilemma under the absolute di-
rector primacy model that is the focal point of this Article (and, thus, my 
attempt at more visibility and less “blackness” in the current corporate 
decisionmaking black box described above) has focused on directorial 
moral behavior—the dialectic confrontation of a limitless range of op-
portunities in the reality of corporate practice with normative directorial 
preferences.  I argue that normative directorial preferences are controlled 
by “protolegal variables.”  Those variables constitute all forms of socio-
contextual,
 
298 behavior-oriented and reciprocal299 normative implications 
and foundations of interpersonal cooperation that are not enforceable at 
law, but that are, similar to legal imperatives, based on the interplay of 
expectations and counter-expectations that underlies social and private-
party ordering.300
I posit that a theory of protonormative calculativeness (which uti-
lizes the directorial moral psychology as a set of internalized calculative 
devices rather than a set of internalized moral norms) may help explain 
the requiting stability and cohesion of the corporate venture that is the 
 
 
 296. Cf. Grossman, supra note 53, at 465-66; Rock & Wachter, supra note 9, at 
1608; Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 9. See also Meurer, supra note 53, at 740 
(stating with regard to the problem of unforeseeable contingencies in transaction-cost-
theory ‘contracting’ that “this begs the questions of how a firm gets managers to be pure 
profit maximizers”). 
 297. ANTOINE DE SAINT-EXUPÉRY, supra note 246, at 63. 
 298. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 13. 
 299. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 159 (“Reciprocity means that in response to 
friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more cooperative than pre-
dicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions they are fre-
quently much more nasty and even brutal.”). 
 300. LUHMANN, LOVE, supra note 51; LUHMANN, RISK supra note 51; LUHMANN, 
SOCIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 51; LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER, supra note 51; Luh-
mann, Familiarity, supra note 51, at 97 (“You cannot live without forming expectations 
with respect to contingent events and you have to neglect, more or less, the possibility 
of disappointment. You neglect this because it is a very rare possibility, but also be-
cause you do not know what else to do. The alternative is to live in a state of permanent 
uncertainty and to withdraw expectations without having anything with which to re-
place them.”).  See also Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1796; Miller, 
supra note 51, at 641; Mitchell, Trust, supra note 23, at 191; Stout, Investor Confi-
dence, supra note 51, at 410-15. 
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result of a (real or imagined) reduction of the systemic risk which firm 
participants’ sunk investments otherwise logically face at the hands of 
“uncommanded commanders,” namely corporate directors with absolute 
decisional primacy.  In my view, such protonormative calculativeness is 
double-blind.  Calculativeness exists, but normative actors, such as cor-
porate directors, are unaware that it exists.  Indeed, I argue that they 
must not be aware of it.  They must obscure and obfuscate calculative-
ness at all cost.301  Normative actors must be unable to perceive them-
selves as “calculative actors” and must rather deceive and view them-
selves as “good moral actors.”  Only in this way can preferences solidify 
and prevail over opportunities with some predictive accuracy (instead of 
the other way around, which, of course, creates our core agency cost 
problem and dilemma in corporate governance).  I argue that such direc-
torial behavioral preferences, however, only solidify if the normative ac-
tors blind themselves (i.e., deceive themselves) and reciprocally rein-
force their calculative blindness (for example, through the use of the 
trust “mechanism” as discussed above).  Were normative actors to be-
come aware of their manipulative reality of obscured, blinded calcula-
tiveness (i.e., by confronting themselves with its truth and their own 
normative hypocrisy), I posit that they would immediately and irrevoca-
bly destroy the essence of their calculative relationship302
 
 301. Cf. Williamson, Calculativeness, supra note 85, at 479 (explaining how the 
suppression of calculativeness itself may be calculative, thereby making it impossible to 
ever achieve pure non-calculative trust). 
 (given that it is 
 302. Cf. Blair & Stout, Trustworthiness, supra note 5, at 1797 (“Conversely, trying 
to shore up trust behavior by making it easier for corporate participants to ‘litigate trust’ 
may produce the counterintuitive result of an increase in the incidence of the untrust-
worthy behavior.”); id. at 1808-09; Dent, Race, supra note 212, at 1004; Gambetta, su-
pra note 85, at 213-14 (“The unqualified claim that more cooperation than we normally 
get would be desirable . . . , if preached too extensively, may even have the effect of 
making cooperation less attractive.”) (footnote and reference omitted); Hill & O’Hara, 
supra note 258, at 1793 (“We think that the window of actual liability for breaches of 
the duty of care should remain small.  A larger window might encourage costly and in-
efficient levels of residual distrust, where directors are overly motivated to ‘look for 
everything’ and officers, feeling distrusted, are more apt to behave in an untrustworthy 
manner.”) (footnote omitted); Jones, supra note 15, at 109 (“[T]he prospect of dispro-
portionate penalties hinder the internalization of appropriate moral values by corporate 
leaders.”); Langevoort, supra note 12, at 831 (“When the law becomes too aggressive, it 
risks altering the social dynamic of the board in a way that makes it less effective as a 
working group.”); Mitchell, Trusted, supra note 13, at 606; (describing that Oliver E. 
Williamson’s economic model of trust may make the point that personal trust only aris-
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a fake) and with it, of course, the predictive utility of their calculative-
ness.303
Therefore, protonormative, double-blind calculativeness appears to 
be the only visible explanation, to date, of the phenomenon of general 
investor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of absent director ac-
countability ex-post-investment.  For the time being, it appears to consti-
tute the only visible, though tentative backstop—thus, the only prin-
ciple—against abuses of directorial discretion under absolute 
decisionmaking primacy, which abuses remain non-approbated in the 
legal, market and social contexts.  I made the point in my opening 
sketches above that something like “hope” (i.e., a “morally rational” ex-
pectation extended by firm participants to directors that the latter will 
use their respective moral compasses and will get it “right” more often 
than not and protect and increase the former’s investment in the firm) 
does not appear to be something that we can and should accept as a sa-
tisfactory explanation and basis for the daily phenomenon of general in-
vestor confidence ex-ante-investment in the face of absent director ac-
countability ex-post-investment.
 
304
 
  Further inquiry into this 
phenomenon may show that hope—more precisely, double-blind calcul-
ative hope—may be all there is to explain the phenomenon. 
 
es in very special and limited occasions in which the existence and awareness of calcu-
lativeness and monitoring would destroy such special trust relationship); Stout, Proper 
Motives, supra note 12, at 18 (evaluating empirical studies of altruistic behavior derived 
from experimental games called ‘social dilemmas’ and stating that “empirical evidence 
suggests that if we place too heavy a burden on such altruistic motivations, they will 
crumble under the weight”). 
 303. And, arguably, reciprocity may then often result in brutal opportunism of cor-
porate actors.  Cf. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 49, at 159 (“Reciprocity means that in 
response to friendly actions, people are frequently much nicer and much more coopera-
tive than predicted by the self-interest model; conversely, in response to hostile actions 
they are frequently much more nasty and even brutal.”). 
 304. Cf. Stout, Proper Motives, supra note 12, at 3, 8 (asking why directors “seem to 
mostly live up to our trust”); id. at 9 (“Rational investors would never cede control of 
tens of trillions of dollars of assets to purely self-interested boards, given the tissue-
paper thin protection offered by the rules of fiduciary duty, and the limits of social sanc-
tions.”). 
